




















Senter for teknologi, innovasjon og kultur 
Universitetet i Oslo 
 
Centre for technology, 
innovation and culture 




Eilert Sundts House, 7th floor 
Moltke Moesvei 31 
 
Phone: +47 22 84 16 00 








Understanding the heterogeneity of cooperation on innovation: 





th FP project 
 
Martin Srholec 
Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture (TIK) 






Innovation is new combination of productive means that are internal or external to 
a firm. Arrangements to cooperate on innovation facilitate access to these external 
sources  of  knowledge.  Using  large  micro  datasets  from  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Community  Innovation  Surveys  in  sixteen  European  countries,  including  nine 
new EU members, we examine the heterogeneity of relationships between various 
characteristics  of  firms,  given  by  size,  ownership  or  capabilities,  and  their 
propensity  to  cooperate  on  innovation  with  domestic  as  compared  to  foreign 
partners, with different types of organizations and how these patterns differ across 
countries.  Econometric  estimates  of  univariate,  multivariate  and  multinomial 
probit  (or  logit)  models  indicate  differences  between  domestic  and  foreign 
cooperation, but  not between the  various  types  of partners. Strong differences 
have been found along the level of economic development. Size of the country 
and openness to globalization proved relevant for explaining cooperation of firms 
on innovation abroad. Nevertheless, the results reveal that the context matters for 
interpretation  of  the  cooperation  variables  themselves,  because  some  of  these 
arrangements may signal limited internal capabilities of firms, rather than virtuous 
systemic interactions, which complicates comparative studies of this data.  
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1. Introduction 
Innovation requires new combination of productive means. Some of them are inside the firm, 
while others need to be obtained externally. A purely “off-the shelf” purchase of some of 
these  external  resources  is  not  efficient,  because  transfer  of  knowledge  often  requires 
interactive learning between users and producers (von Hippel 1976, Lundvall 1988). Firms 
are not islands separated by deep waters of market transactions, but are linked together in 
patterns of cooperation, especially as far as the development of new products and processes is 
concerned (Richardson 1972). Arrangements to cooperate on innovation facilitate access to 
this  external  knowledge,  offering  opportunities  for  sharing  complementary  resources  with 
other organizations, spreading risks of the innovative ventures across partners and jointly 
overcoming obstacles along the route (Gulati 1998, Sachwald 1998), hence making firms 
more likely to come out with the new combinations. 
 
Availability of direct evidence on innovation cooperation from the Community Innovation 
Survey triggered a growing body of empirical research on this topic (see for example Arora 
and Gambardella 1994, Colombo 1995, Veugelers 1997, Nooteboom 1999, Cassiman and 
Veugelers 2002, Tether 2002, Miotti and Sachwald 2003, Becker and Dietz 2004, Belderbos 
et al. 2004 and 2006, Knell and Srholec 2004, Negassi 2004, Abramovsky et al. 2009, Lööf 
2009 and Srholec 2009a), which is increasingly conducted by using advanced econometric 
methods on micro data. As a result, there is now fairly extensive empirical literature on the 
cooperative behaviour of firms in the innovation process. But there also remain a host of 
rarely  examined  topics  that  are  essential  to  explore  for  formulating  effective  innovation 
policies in context of the enlarged, globalized and challenged European community.  
 
Admittedly, there is too little evidence on cooperation with foreign partners, except perhaps 
of Knell and Srholec (2004), Lööf (2009) and Srholec (2009a), and therefore on the effects of 
organization and market proximity abroad, which is surprising given the fact that the literature 
on strategic alliances has shown that international collaboration on innovation is a prominent 
aspect  of  globalization  (Archibugi  and  Michie  1995,  Narual  and  Hagedoorn  1999  and 
Hagedoorn 2002). Some of the papers considered differences between types of the partner 
organization, such as Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) or Belderbos et al. (2004, 2006), though 
this literature is rather thin too. So far very little has been done to econometrically compare 
patterns of innovation cooperation across countries, because most of the existing studies have 
been limited to evidence from a single or a small number of national datasets, only except of 
the recent papers by Abramovsky et al. (2009) and Srholec (2009a), which prevents us from 
deriving broader policy recommendations from the results. 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this debate by addressing these relatively neglected 
topics.  Using  large  micro  datasets  from  sixteen  countries  from  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Community  Innovation  Surveys,  including  nine  new  EU  members,  we  econometrically 
examine heterogeneity of the relationship between various characteristics of firms, given by 
size, ownership or capabilities, and their propensity to cooperate on innovation with domestic 
as compared to foreign partners, with different types of organizations and how these patterns 
differ across countries. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the key issues. Section 3 
presents the micro data and explains measures of the national framework conditions. Section 
4  explores  descriptive  evidence  on  the  cooperation  variables.  Section  5  delineates  the 
regression models, debates methodological problems and presents results of the univariate, 
multivariate and multinomial, including multilevel, probit (or logit) econometric estimates. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 3 
 
2. Taking stock of the issues 
Since strong uncertainty runs throughout the process of innovation (Dosi 1988, Verspagen 
2004),  complete  contracts  for  innovation  cooperation  cannot  be  written  and  these 
arrangements  are  likely  to  generate  knowledge  spillovers  (De  Bondt  1996).  Innovation 
cooperation  is  therefore  the  mechanism  through  which  knowledge  spills  between  various 
organizations in the economy. If any knowledge spillovers exist in reality, they are channelled 
through  this  mechanism.  If  partners  from  different  countries  are  involved,  furthermore, 
cooperation on innovation channels knowledge over national borders. Given the pivotal role 
of knowledge spillovers in generating economic growth (Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 
1998),  it  is  imperative  to  improve  our  understanding  of  factors  that  explain  these 
arrangements. 
 
Cooperation unlocks the internal constraints for innovation. Arrangements to cooperate on 
innovation facilitate access to external sources of knowledge, spread costs and risks among 
the partners, and allow firms to benefit from division of labour in the innovation process 
(Gulati  1998,  Sachwald  1998,  Miotti  and  Sachwald  2003).  Strategic  motives  point  to 
cooperation  as  the  organizational  answer  to  increasing  complexity  of  research  and  rapid 
technology  progress.  By  networking  firms  can  pool  complementary  resources  with  other 
organizations and make use of resources owned by others. Although some of these external 
resources  can  be  purchased  when  needed  on  markets  for  technology  (Arora  et  al.  2001), 
others  are  embodied  in  the  people  and  organizations,  which  make  them  hard  to  transfer 
through market transactions (Lundvall 1988, Maskell and Malmberg 1999).  
 
Building  on  evolutionary  grounds,  the  interactive  nature  of  innovation  process  has  been 
elaborated  in  the  literature  on  national  innovation  systems  (Lundvall  1992,  Nelson  1993, 
Edquist 1997). From this perspective the ability of firms to capitalize on external knowledge 
embedded in social networks is crucial for successful innovation process. Localized nature of 
interactive  learning  has  been  further  emphasized  in  the  literature  on  regional  innovation 
systems  (Asheim  and  Gertler  2004),  which  highlights  relationships  among  the  internal 
organization  of  firms,  their  connections  to  one  another  and  to  the  social  structures  and 
institutions  of  their  particular  localities.  At  the  core  of  these  systemic  approaches  to 
innovation is therefore the idea that behaviour of firms in the innovation process needs to be 
understood in the context of the local framework conditions.  
 
So what should we expect to find with regards to spatial differences in the propensity of firms 
to  cooperate?  A romantic prediction  derived from  the systemic perspective is  that denser 
networks  of  cooperation on innovation  between firms and other organizations  hallmark a 
superior innovation system (OECD 2001, European Commission 2009), because these are the 
virtuous  systemic  interactions  that  facilitate  reciprocal  access  to  advanced  knowledge 
generated  in  different  parts  of  the  system.  Nevertheless,  there  could  be  a  twin  side  of 
cooperation in less advanced environments. Firms can also cooperate precisely because of 
limited internal capabilities to solve problems arising in the innovation process alone, even 
though more capable firms can do so without involving others into the process elsewhere. 
Naturally, this puts the question of internal capabilities of firms to the forefront of this debate. 
Does  the  relationship  between  capabilities  and  cooperativeness  of  firms  differ  across 
countries? Could it be that in less advanced countries firms in fact strive to cooperate because 
of limited internal innovation capabilities? 
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At  the  centre  of  interest  in  this  study,  yet  often  neglected  in  the  existing  literature,  is 
furthermore  the  relationship  between  cooperation  with  local  and  foreign  partners.  Firms 
increasingly need to pool resources from different external sources to innovate ever more 
complex products (Miotti and Sachwald 2003). Some of them are close, whereas others can 
be found only in distant locations. Innovation might be therefore perhaps best viewed as a 
result of a combination of close and distant interactions (Bathelt et al. 2004). It is likely that 
firms favour to cooperate with partners in their proximity, if anything to avoid costs and 
obstacles of venturing far away. In other words, firms are likely to start searching for partners 
locally and extend the screening to more remote locations only if they cannot find relevant 
partners in not too distant place.  
 
From  this  naturally  follows  that  firms  should  choose  domestic  over  foreign  partners  for 
cooperation if there are partners with the needed complementary resources in their vicinity. A 
lack of complementary resources locally, for example in countries significantly behind the 
technological  frontier,  on  the  other  hand,  should  encourage  firms  to  engage  with  foreign 
partners to overcome shortcomings in the local knowledge base. Firms might not be able to 
find relevant partners for cooperation in the same country for two primary reasons. First, there 
is not much to choose from because the national innovation system is underdeveloped, so that 
firms escape the local poverty by cooperating with foreigners. Second, there are not many 
relevant domestic partners because the country in small. Size of the country is likely to matter 
for the propensity to engage with foreign partners for natural reasons, because firms in larger 
countries are by principle less likely to interact (trade, invest or cooperate) across national 
borders, because there are simply more domestic organizations to do business with.  
 
An intimately related issue is the effect of foreign ownership of firms, a major symptom of 
globalization that channels knowledge between countries (Blomström and Kokko 1998), on 
their propensity to cooperate on innovation. Multinational corporations are known to limit 
spillovers  of  their  knowledge  to  non-affiliated  firms  in  order  to  protect  their  ownership 
advantages  (Dunning  1988,  Caves  1996),  which  may  circumvent  cooperation  of  foreign 
affiliates with local firms, so that they often remain poorly embedded in the local innovation 
system, especially in countries behind the technology frontier (Lall 1980, Kokko et al. 1996, 
UNCTAD 2001). But at the same time foreign ownership may bring significant side effects 
that catalyze knowledge flows across borders. Although going abroad for cooperation may not 
be easy, since all kinds of cognitive, institutional and other barriers stand in the way,  as 
already  pointed  above,  foreign  ownership  provides  organizational  proximity  to  distant 
locations (Lundvall 1988) that may help firms to overcome them. Hence, foreign affiliates 
should have an inherent advantage to access foreign partners for cooperation through contacts 
of their parents other firms in the group abroad.  
 
It is important to understand, however, that international business does not undermine the role 
of  local  innovation  systems  (Narula  2003).  Quite  the  contrary  is  in  fact  the  outcome  of 
globalization of production (Maskell and Malmberg 1999, Rugman and D’Cruz 2003). Free 
access  to  international  markets  in  capital  goods  and  other  inputs,  including  codified 
knowledge, that for a given price become available for everybody actually strengthens the 
role of idiosyncratic strategic capabilities. Even if firms invest and cooperate abroad to tap 
into  foreign  sources  of  tacit  knowledge  (Chesnais  1992,  Cantwell  1995),  these  strategic 
capabilities of firms remain by their very nature embedded in – possibly multiple but still – 
local innovation systems (Pavitt and Patel 1999). And the deepening specialization of firms in 
these  core  competencies  within  the  globally  dispersed  production  networks  even  more 
reinforces the need to pool complementary resources among various partners for innovation. 5 
 
3. Overview of the dataset 
The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a  large  sample  of  firms  from  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Community Innovation Surveys  (CIS3 and CIS4 henceforth) provided by Eurostat, which 
asked firms about various aspects of their innovation activity from 1998 to 2000 and from 
2002  to  2004  respectively  (Eurostat  2007  and  2009).
  Firms  from  the  following  sixteen 
European countries, including nine new EU members, are in the datasets: Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Germany,  Hungary,  Greece,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Norway, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Romania.
1  
 
Following  the  Oslo  Manual  (OECD  1997  and  2005)  a  harmonized  questionnaire  and 
methodology was used to collect the data. However, there are some prevailing national 
differences with regards to design of the questionnaire, industry coverage, or imputation of 
the missing data, which had to be dealt with to derive fully harmonized cross -country 
evidence; details on how this has been done are available from the author upon request. Some 
of the variables containing sensitive financial information , such as the value of turnover, 
exports  or  the  amount  of  innovation  expenditure,  w ere  so-called  micro-aggregated  by 
averaging data for three similar firms, though the binary and Likert scale variables remained 
unchanged in these datasets. Since we do not need to use the micro-aggregated variables, with 
only one exception further explained below, results of this study refer to evidence directly at 
the firm level. 
 
All firms have been asked to provide information about structural characteristics with regards 
to their size, affiliation to a group or distance of their market, but only those firms that 
claimed to innovate has been asked to provide further details on their innovation activity, 
including the questions on cooperation, R&D activity or sources of information.  Since the 
cooperative behaviour concerns only those firms that attempted to innovate, and there is a 
lack of instrumental variables that could identify Heckman sample selection model,
 we restrict 
the sample to innovation active firms according to definition of the Oslo Manual; i.e. those 
that introduced a new product, a new process or reported not yet completed or abandoned 
innovation activities over the reference period.
 2 It is therefore important to bear in mind that 
the evidence presented below refers only to the sub-sample of innovating firms and should be 
interpreted accordingly.  
 
Our dependent variables are derived from the set of questions on whether the firm cooperated 
on any of its innovation activities with other organizations.
3 Firms were asked to indicate the 
                                                 
1 For most countries the reference period was according to the recommendation, the exception being that the 
Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and  Norway  covered  the  period  from  1999  to  2001,  Romania 
covered the period from 2000 to 2002 and Bulgaria covered the period from 2001 to 2003 in CIS3; and the 
Czech Republic had a reference period from 2003 to 2005 in CIS4.  Also data from Iceland is included in the 
CIS3 CD-ROM distributed by Eurostat, but this information could not be used in this analysis due to missing 
data for the key variables for about two-thirds of the sample.  
2 By focusing on the innovative active firms, the inferences presented below can be influenced by a sample 
selection bias, which arises when the dependent variable is observed only for a non -randomly restricted sample. 
To correct for the possible bias, we could use the so -called Heckman’s procedure (Heckman 1976). But to 
properly identify the exclusion restriction we require a variable that is a relevant predictor of the propensity of 
firms  to  innovate  but  not  of  their  propensity  to  cooperate.  Unfortunately,  there  is  no  variable  with  these 
properties available in the data, so that the only way to identify the selection turned out to be the functional form, 
though this has been deemed as unsatisfactory. 
3 Innovation cooperation was exactly defined as active participation with other enterprises or non -commercial 
institutions on innovation activities in the harmonized CIS4 questionnaire and as active participation in joint 6 
 
location and type of the partner, from which we derive a series of more detailed dummy 
variables. As far as the location is concerned, firms reported whether they cooperated with a 
partner in their home country or a partner located abroad with a distinction into several groups 
of foreign countries, which we condense into shortcuts “dom” for a domestic partner, “for” 
for a partner in at least one foreign country and in addition “tot” for a total combination of 
(domestic or foreign) partners that are used to delineate the respective form of cooperation in 
names of the variables. Seven types of the partner organisation are distinguished with the 
following  shortcuts:  GP  (other  enterprises  within  the  respondent’s  group  of  firms);  SUP 
(suppliers  of  equipment,  materials,  components,  or  software;  CUS  (clients  or  customers); 
COM (competitors or other enterprises in the same sector);  INS (consultants, commercial 
labs, or private R&D institutes); UNI (universities or other higher education institutions); and 
GMT (government or public research institutes).
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Since one of the  key predictors, for more see below, is the information whether the firm is 
affiliated to a (domestic or foreign) enterp rise group,  in the first instance  we distinguish 
between internal cooperation along the ownership lines with other firms affiliated to the group 
(GP) and external cooperation with partners that are outside of the group  (SUP, CUS, COM, 
INS, UNI or GMT), which gives the shortcut EXT for the external partners taken together . 
Naturally, only firms that are affiliated to a group can report cooperation with other members 
of the group, in other words these  variables are correlated by definition, so that the intern al 
cooperation needs to be excluded from definition of the dependent variable if the information 
on whether the firm is a part of a group is used as a predictor in the econometric estimates 
below.  
 
Table 1 outlines genesis of the dependent variables. COdomGP, COforGP and COtotGP refer 
to dummies with value 1 if the firm reported cooperation with an affiliated partner  within the 
group and COdomEXT, COforEXT and COtotEXT are dummies with value 1 if the firm had 
at least one cooperation arrangement with an  (non-affiliated) external partner, where “dom”, 
“for”  and “tot”  stand for domestic, foreign or total partners, respectively. EXT is further 
decomposed in a battery of variables for each of the six types of external partners. Finally, 
COtotALL is an overall dummy with value 1 if the firm answered positively at least once, i.e. 
the firm has at least one cooperation arrangement regardless of the location (tot) and type 
(ALL) of the partner. Obviously, this gives quite complex stratum of dependent variables, 
which  requires  using  (bivariate  or)  multivariate  econometric  methods,  as  further  shown 
below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
R&D and other innovation projects with other organisations in the CIS3 questionnaire. Pure contracting out of 
work with no active collaboration was emphasized to be not regarded as cooperation in both of them. 
4  CIS3,  but  not  CIS4,  included  a  further  distinction  between  consultants  on  one  hand  and  comme rcial 
laboratories/R&D enterprises on the other hand, which we combined into the single “INS” category in this paper 
in order to use the same classification of partners.  7 
 
 
Table 1: Definition of the dummy dependent variables of innovation cooperation 
 
Type / location of the partner  Domestic location  Foreign location  Total location 
Other enterprises within your enterprise group  COdomGP  COforGP    COtotGP   




























Clients or customers  COdomCUS  COforCUS  COtotCUS 
Competitors or other enterprises in your sector  COdomCOM  COforCOM  COtotCOM 
Consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes  COdomINS  COforINS  COtotINS 
Universities or other higher education institutions  COdomUNI  COforUNI  COtotUNI 
Government or public research institutes  COdomGMT  COforGMT  COtotGMT 




To learn more about what drives cooperation of firms with the foreign partners in particular, 
which is the focal point of this analysis, we further create a multinomial variable COmnlEXT 
for external cooperation with four mutually exclusive outcomes delineated as follows: 0 if the 
firm did not cooperate (COtotALL = 0), 1 if the firm cooperated with a domestic external 
partner only (COdomEXT = 1 and COforEXT = 0), 2 if the firm cooperated with a foreign 
partner only (COdomEXT = 0 and COforEXT = 1), and 3 if the firm cooperated with both 
domestic and foreign partners at the same time (COforEXT = 1 and COdomEXT = 1). The 
idea is to create a variable that allows us to zoom on those firms that cooperate exclusively 
with partners abroad on one hand or at home on the other hand, because as shall be shown 
below  so  many  cooperating  firms  tend  to  engage  with  both  of  them,  which  makes  their 
distinction somewhat futile in context of the bivariate model. 
 
Besides a battery of industry and country dummies to control for the respective contextual 
effects, we take into account a number of firm-specific explanatory variables that include 
structural characteristics of firms given by their size, ownership structure and distance of their 
market and a set of variables that capture resources, capabilities and perceptions of firms with 
regards to the innovation process represented by their R&D activity, screening of external 
sources of knowledge, appropriability conditions of their knowledge base and how the firms 
perceive obstacles to innovation. All of these have been suggested as relevant explanatory 
factors of the cooperative behaviour of firms in the literature discussed above, most of them 
have been also already tested in the existing empirical studies on this topic, however it will be 
interesting  to  see  whether  their  effects  differ  by  the  different  kinds  of  cooperative 
arrangements  and last  but  not  least  to  compare  these effects  across the different  national 
settings. Let us now provide more detailed definition of these firm-level predictors. 
 
Scale advantages are essential to control for, because the cooperation variables refer to firms 
having at least one cooperation arrangement, so that larger firms are by principle more likely 
to  report  at  least  one  positive  answer.  Nevertheless,  size  of  the  firm  proved  difficult  to 
measure in this data, since the number of employees, which is the conventional measure of 
size  in  empirical  studies  like  these,  has  been  perceived  as  confidential  information  by 
Eurostat, and therefore not included in the datasets, not even in the micro-aggregated form. 
CIS4  data  provides  only  classification  of  firms  into  three  broad  categories  in  terms  of 
employment, from which we derive dummies for SMALL (0-49 employees), MEDIUM (50-
249 employees) and LARGE (more than 250 employees) firms. Size turned out to be even 
more  problematic  to  determine  in  the  CIS3  dataset,  which  includes  the  same  size 
classification  in  terms  of  employment,  but  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  firms  have  been 
assigned to mixed classes of these three broad size categories, which makes this information 
useless in the econometric framework.
5 At least, however, this dataset includes  the micro-
aggregated value of turnover, which can be used to proxy for  the  size  classes  of firms, 
because the standard Eurostat’s definition of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) refers 
not only to a threshold on the base of employment but also in terms of turnover.
6 According to 
this definition, we therefore classify firms in the CIS3 dataset by the three size categories on 
the base of their annual turnover into SMALL (not exceeding EUR 7 million), MEDIUM 
                                                 
5 Also in the CIS4 data from Italy these size categories were combined for certain observations, which must have 
been excluded from the analysis, but these accounted for less than 5% of the Italian sample, so that this should 
not have a large effect on the reported results. 
6 For more details see 96/280/EC: Commission Recommendation of 3 April 1996 concerning the definition of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Note that we use the Commission Recommendation of 3 April 1996, which 
is no longer in force, rather than the more recent  2003/361/EC definition that is in force from  6 May 2003, 
because the value of turnover in the CIS3 dataset refers to the earlier period. 9 
 
(exceeding EUR 7 but not exceeding 40 million) and LARGE (exceeding EUR 40 million).
7 
Both in CIS3 and CIS4 these dummies refer to size of the firms at the beginning of the 
reference period. SMALL is used as the based category and  is therefore excluded from the 
estimates. 
 
Alternatively, we could  simply use the natural logarithm of the micro-aggregated turnover, 
but then results of the size variables (and therefore also possibly of the other coefficients) may 
not be comparable between the estimates based on  the CIS3 and CIS4 data, which has been 
deemed as a major disadvantage. Since size of the firms in terms of employment, it should be 
further noted, has been a major input into the micro-aggregating procedure of turnover, only 
data for firms in the same size categories should have been aggregated together, and therefore 
the size dummies derived in the CIS3 data should be actually very close to the firm -specific 
information. Furthermore, this  classification produced  within country  size distributions of 
firms that are broadly comparable (if adjusted for non-response, etc.) to the structure of the 
same CIS3 samples by size  based on employment available for download at the aggregated 
level from Eurostat on-line, which indicates that the size categories based on turnover used 
here should not suffer from a major bias.  
 
Next, two predictors have been derived from the question whether the firm is  a part of an 
enterprise group, which  should provide the  firm with extended reach both organizationally 
and geographically, and therefore boost its odds to find a relevant partner (even an external 
one) for cooperation. Affiliated firms were further asked about the country where the head 
office is located, which we use to derive two  mutually exclusive variables for the group 
membership. FORGP, which is used as a proxy for foreign ownership, has value 1 if the firm 
is affiliated to a group with headquarters abroad. DOMGP has value 1 if the firm is affiliated 
to a group with headquarters  in the same country. Unfortunately, the questionnaire does not 
allow us to identify whether the do mestic-based group has operations in other countries, so 
that this dummy covers not only solely domestic groups, but also home-based multinational 
corporations. In any case,  firms affiliated to a domestic  group are likely to be much more 
rooted  in  the  nati onal  environment  than  those  with  headquarter s  abroad  with  obvious 
implication for cooperation at home. All other firms are NOGP, which means non-affiliated to 
a group, and these are used as the base category. 
 
EXP is a dummy for exporters, which represents market proximity to foreign locations. This 
variable  is  defined  slightly  different  in  the  CIS3  and  CIS4  datasets.  CIS4  included  a 
straightforward question on which geographic markets did the firm sell goods or services with 
a distinction between local, national, other EU and all other countries, so that EXP has value 1 
in the firm reported to deliver to the foreign markets. CIS3 asked about geographic distance of 
the most significant market, so that in this sample the  EXP dummy has value 1 if the firm’s 
main market has been marked as international (and with a distance of more than 50 km). The 
main difference is that answers to these questions were mutually exclusive in CIS3, i.e. only 
one geographic market can be “the most significant”, whereas firms were allowed to check 
several positive answers in CIS4, so that the  variable is relatively more restrictive in the 
former. If the firm exported, but the foreign market did not happen to be the most significant 
market, the EXP variable has value 0 in CIS3, but value 1 in CIS4. 
                                                 
7 Unlike employment, however, currency units need to be transformed into a common base for international 
comparison. Since the sample includes countries at largely different levels of development, and therefore with 
different ratios between the nominal exchange rate and purchasing power of the local currency, the turnover 
figures reported in nominal EUR in the dataset have been adjusted according to purchasing parity standards 
(PPS) before constructing dummies for the size categories. 10 
 
 
Furthermore, firms were asked  for details about their innovation activity, from which we 
develop four variables on their resources, capabilities and perceptions with regards to  the 
innovation  process.  A  traditional  measure  in  this  domain  is  whether  the  firm  devotes 
resources to research and experimental development (R&D) activity that is routinely used in 
empirical studies to represent not only the ability of firms to generate new knowledge, but 
also their capacity to absorb relevant knowledge from outside (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), 
which should obviously boost their cooperativeness for both reasons. R&D dummy has value 
1 if the firm engaged into this activity over the three-year reference period.
8 
 
Another relevant question refers to the op enness of firms to  sources of  information from 
outside, which captures their absorptive capacity from  a  different angle (Veugelers and 
Cassiman 1999). Firms were asked to indicate importance of information for their innovation 
projects from a number of sources, including those that the question about cooperation refers 
to such as  suppliers, customers, competitors,  research institutes,  universities, etc., but also 
from “other” external sources such as various professional events, journals and associations. 
To  avoid  overlap  in  definition  between  the  dependent  cooperation  variables  and  the 
explanatory  variable  derived  from  this  question,  for  instance  by  attempting  to  explain 
cooperation with a supplier by a variable reflecting importance of information from the same 
source, we do not take into account the first group of sources. INFO dummy has value 1 if the 
firm  indicated  either  i)  conferences,  trade  fairs,  exhibitions;  ii)  scientific  journals  and 
trade/technical  publications;  or  iii)  professional  and  industry  associations  in  CIS4;  and  i) 
professional conferences, meetings, journals; or ii) fairs and exhibitions in CIS3, as highly 
important  sources  of  information  for  their  innovation  activity.  The  idea  is  that  in  these 
questions the firm declared general openness to external information, which should allow us 
to  discriminate  between  inward  and  outward  looking  strategies.  Screening  of  these 
information sources provides the firm with enhanced knowledge about the pool of potential 
partners  for  cooperation,  in  other  words  the  “know-who”  kind  of  knowledge  in  terms  of 
Lundvall and Johnson (1994), which should make the firm relatively more likely to team up 
with others in the innovation process. 
 
Appropriability  conditions  of  the  firms’  knowledge  base  given  by  their  ability  to  protect 
intellectual property rights by patents or other means has been also shown to be one of the key 
predictors of cooperation (Cassiman and Veugelers 2002). For this factor, the survey provides 
us with a set of binary answers on questions about making use of formal methods to protect 
technology developed by the firm. PROT is a dummy which takes value 1 if the firm applied 
for a patent, registered  an industrial design, registered a trademark or  claimed copyright. 
Being able to limit outgoing spillovers of knowledge by these formal means should boost the 
appetite  of  firms  for  opening  gates  for  the  external  cooperation  partners,  and  therefore 
increase the odds of a positive outcome on the dependent variables. 
 
                                                 
8 In CIS3 this variable combines a question whether the firm engaged in R&D in the final year of the reference 
period and a separate question whether the firm engaged in R&D continuously or occasionally over the three 
year period, so that the R&D dummy variable has value 1 if the firm answered positively on the first and 
indicated to engage in R&D at least occasionally over the whole period in the second. Hence both in CIS3 and 
CIS4 the R&D dummy refers to the three-year period. However, in Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian CIS3 sub-
samples data on the second question turned out to be corrupted, because all firms had values indicating either 
occasional or permanent R&D, i.e. according to the data there should have been no firms without R&D over the 
three-years, which is not possible, hence for these sub-samples the R&D dummy refers only the first question on 
R&D in the last year, which includes a realistic amount of zeros. 11 
 
Firms were further asked to assess the extent to which they struggled with various hampering 
factors in the innovation process. For the sake of comparability, we take into account only 
those kinds of obstacles with close counterparts in both CIS3 and CIS4, which therefore refer 
to financial, cost-driven and lack of internal capability hampering factors. OBS that stands for 
obstacles is a dummy with value 1 if the firm marked at least one of i) Lack of funds within 
the enterprise or group; ii) Lack of finance from sources outside the enterprise; iii) Innovation 
costs too high; iv) Lack of qualified personnel; v) Lack of information on technology; or vi) 
Lack  of  information  on  markets  in  CIS4;  and  i)  Innovation  costs  too  high;  ii)  Lack  of 
appropriate sources of finance; iii) Lack of qualified personnel; iv) Lack of information on 
technology; or v) Lack of information on markets in CIS3, as highly important hampering 
factors. The rationale for this variable is to single out those firms that faced acute difficulties 
in their innovation project. It should be emphasized, however, that these answers represent 
more than anything else firm’s perceptions about the obstacles, which may not be comparable 
in  an  objective  sense,  and  should  be  interpreted  accordingly  (Mohnen  and  Röller  2005, 
Clausen 2008). Arguably, firms that perceive stronger internal difficulties should be more 
likely to search for external help, but on the other hand these obstacles might undermine the 
project to the extent that cooperation becomes unfeasible. It will be interesting to see which of 
these effects prevails.  
 
Finally, industry dummies delineated by the IND shortcut are based on a classification that 
broadly follows alphabetical NACE, rev. 1.1 structure with 20 categories in CIS4 and 17 
categories in CIS3 covering firms in both industry and market services.
9 Food and tobacco 
manufacturing (DA) is used  as the base category in the estimates, because this industry  is 
populated by relatively many firms in all countries and the overall cooperation propensity  of 
firms in this industry is very close to the sample mean (which is relevant for interpretation of 
the  logit  multilevel  estimates,  as  further  explained  below).  Similarly,  county  dummies 
delineated by the NAT shortcut  are derived from location of the firms  within borders of the 
respective countries.  
                                                 
9 More detailed industrial classification was not possible to use due to limitations of the datasets, which includes 
only relatively aggregated codes due to confidentially concerns by Eurostat. Definition of the industry dummies 
used in the analysis is available from the author upon request.  12 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive overview of the micro data. After omitting observations with 
missing records, the sample includes information for 28,623 firms from CIS4 and 13,827 
firms from CIS3. Almost a third of the innovating firms in the sample engaged in cooperation 
arrangements on innovation, excluding the affiliated partners from the definition or not, most 
of the cooperating firms had a domestic partner, but only about half of them ventured into 
cooperation  with  a  partner  abroad.  Let  us  leave,  however,  more  detailed  analysis  of 
descriptive evidence on the cooperation variables by location, type of the partner and country 
for the next section.  
 
As far as the predictors are concerned, about a fifth of the firms are large, a third of them are 
medium size, from which follows that roughly half of the sample consists of small firms. 
Firms affiliated to a domestic group are much more frequent than those with headquarters 
abroad, though both of them are relatively well represented in the data, which is important for 
deriving reliable estimates of their effects. More than half of the innovating firms engaged in 
R&D activity, about a quarter of them maintained good overview of the potential external 
partners and a third of them managed to protect their knowledge base by formal methods. 
Almost every second firm in CIS4 and little bit less in CIS3 reported facing acute obstacles in 
their innovation activity. Arguably, more interesting than these descriptive numbers for the 
sake of this paper is the relationship of these variables to the propensity of firms to cooperate, 
which we shall not delve more into descriptively, and rather explore in more detail in the 
econometric framework below.   
 
Overall, the descriptive statistics  comes out very similar  for the CIS4 and CIS3 datasets, 
which suggests that there has not been much change in the innovative behaviour of firms 
between  the  two  periods,  but  also  confirms  that  definition  of  the  variables  is  highly 
harmonized,  which  is  encouraging  for  comparison  of  the  econometric  results.  The  main 
difference is in the EXP variable, which should be expected, because this one has noticeably 
different definition, as explained above. Also it should be noted that the size distribution of 
firms appears fairly similar in both vintages of the survey, which confirms that definition of 
these variables based either on employment or turnover gives comparable numbers, at least as 
far as the aggregate descriptive statistics is concerned.  
 
Since we are going to estimate multilevel models, we need data for specific country-level 
variables that capture national framework conditions relevant for explaining the propensity of 
firms  to  cooperate  on  innovation.  To  limit  influence  of  shocks  and  measurement  errors 
occurring in specific years, we use the macro indicators in the form of three-year averages 
over the reference period.
10 All of the indicators are used in logs, partly because of non -
linearity is likely to be involved in these effects as commonly assumed in the literature,  but 
also  because  outliers  in  some  variables  were  detected,  which  has  been  solved  by  the 
logarithmic transformation. Since the CIS3 data covers a smaller sample with too few 
countries to reasonably estimate a multilevel model, we gather the macro variables  for and 
estimate these models only on the CIS4 data. All of the macro variables have been obtained 
from Eurostat on-line, only except of the FDI data which has been derived from UNCTAD 




                                                 
10 Since the reference period differs in some countries, we kept this in mind when constructing the country-level 
variables, so that we computed averages over different three-year periods depending of the timing of the survey 
in the particular country. 13 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive overview of the micro data 
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  N 
 
CIS4: 
COtotALL  0.334  0.472  0  1  28,623 
COtotEXT  0.312  0.464  0  1  28,623 
COdomEXT  0.286  0.452  0  1  28,623 
COforEXT  0.164  0.370  0  1  28,623 
LARGE  0.184  0.387  0  1  28,623 
MEDIUM  0.314  0.464  0  1  28,623 
DOMGP  0.250  0.433  0  1  28,623 
FORGP  0.155  0.362  0  1  28,623 
EXP  0.588  0.492  0  1  28,623 
R&D  0.583  0.493  0  1  28,623 
INFO  0.214  0.410  0  1  28,623 
PROT  0.326  0.469  0  1  28,623 
OBS  0.452  0.498  0  1  28,623 
 
CIS3: 
COtotALL  0.327  0.469  0  1  13,827 
COtotEXT  0.314  0.464  0  1  13,827 
COdomEXT  0.280  0.449  0  1  13,827 
COforEXT  0.174  0.379  0  1  13,827 
LARGE  0.176  0.380  0  1  13,827 
MEDIUM  0.278  0.448  0  1  13,827 
DOMGP  0.215  0.411  0  1  13,827 
FORGP  0.145  0.352  0  1  13,827 
EXP  0.323  0.468  0  1  13,827 
R&D  0.613  0.487  0  1  13,827 
INFO  0.247  0.431  0  1  13,827 
PROT  0.361  0.480  0  1  13,827 
OBS  0.402  0.490  0  1  13,827 
 
Source: Eurostat (2007 and 2009). 
 
 
First, as a measure of the overall level of economic development, we use GDP per capita in 
PPS (Purchasing Power Standard), which refers to the GDPCAP variable in the following. It 
should be noted that there is a long list of variables that can be used to directly measure 
quality of the national research infrastructure, which have been readily employed for this 
purpose  in  the  literature  (Furman  et  al.,  2002,  Archibugi  and  Coco  2004,  Fagerberg  and 
Srholec 2008), such as for example R&D expenditure, R&D employment, the number of 
scientific articles, the number of EPO patents, etc. or a combination thereof, but all of these 
measures tend to be highly correlated to GDPCAP, which makes them impossible to use at 
the same time in econometric estimates for multicollinearity problems. Nevertheless, this is 
important to keep in mind, so that results of the GDPCAP variable are properly understood as 
representing  a  joint  effect  of  a  broad  range  of  factors  closely  related  to  the  level  of 
development,  including  quality  of  the  national  research  infrastructure.  Second,  as  already 14 
 
discussed above, for natural reasons size of the country should be  a relevant predictor of 
national differences in the propensity of firms to cooperate with foreign partners. To control 
for this effect, we use the total population of the country, which constitutes the POP variable.  
 
Finally, globalization of the economy, or in other words the intensity of economic transactions 
across national borders, can play a role in the propensity of firm to venture for cooperation on 
innovation abroad. Among other things, the amount of foreign transactions reflects economic 
policies that can be directed at promoting (or restricting) the involvement of the country in the 
global  economic  system,  which  should  have  consequences  for  foreign  cooperation  on 
innovation  too.  Another  possible  influence  can  be  seen  in  the  realm  of  “demonstration” 
effects by firms going global through trade, investment and other means that may highlight 
avenues for foreign cooperation of other firms. Overall, the extent to which the economy is 
globalized represents general inward/outward orientation of the national system that besides 
economic  factors  can  be  given  by  history,  geography  or  culture.  A  firm  operating  in  an 
economy that is highly globalized for whatever reason should be expected to be in a relatively 
better position to engage in cooperation with foreign partners, as compared to a firm doing 
business in a relatively closed economic system. 
 
Many different symptoms of globalization can be measured with harmonized data these days, 
from which we use three most widely used indicators as follows. IMP refers to a variable for 
import of goods and services. FDI represents the stock of inward foreign direct investment. 
And the LIC variable stands for outward licence payments (debit) for royalties and license 
fees derived from the balance of payments statistics. All three are expressed in % of GDP. 
Again, these indicators are too excessively correlated to each other to include them together in 
a regression estimate, so that we use this insight in a factor analysis to create of composite 
indicator. Since only a single principal factor with eigenvalue higher than 1 has been detected 
(the other two eigenvalues were -0.001 and -0.194 respectively), we have retained one factor 
that accounts for 49.3% of the total variability as follows: IMP (0.795), FDI (0.831) and LIC 
(0.395); factor loadings in brackets; N=15. Principal factors procedure has been used to find 
the solution and regression scoring has been used to generate the GLOBAL variable.
11 
 
Table 3 provides overview these macro variables. As already noted above,  these are used in 
logs to limit the   influence of outliers. Furthermore, the GDPCAP, POP and GLOBAL 
indicators have been standardized by deducting mean and dividing by standard deviation, so 
that these variables appear in the econometric estimates with   mean of zero and standard 
deviation equal to one, which allows us to  directly compare magnitude of their coefficients, 
because they are expressed in the same units of standard deviation after this transformation.  
                                                 
11  GLOBAL  takes  into  account  only  indicators  of  inward  openness  of  the  economy,  because  including  the 
outward variants of IMP, FDI and LIC, which are readily available too, complicates interpretation of the score 
without adding much explanatory power for two major reasons. First, exports tend to be highly correlated in 
cross-country comparisons to imports, because strong forces balancing trade are in play. Of course, countries can 
run a trade deficit (or surplus), but levels of imports and exports relative to size of the country (in % of GDP) are 
extremely correlated. Hence, the intensity on imports by principle already carries out the information about the 
intensity on exports and vice-a-versa. But the main reason for not including none of the indicators of outward 
orientation into GLOBAL is that both the stock of outward foreign direct investment and  incoming licence 
payments (credit) for royalties and license fees are highly correlated to GDP per capita, because these are mixed 
measures of outward openness but also of the technological level of the country. If we had included these into 
the  factor  analysis,  the  resulting  GLOBAL  score  would  be  excessively  correlated  to  GDPCAP,  creating 
muticollineariy problems in the estimates. 15 
 
Table 3: Descriptive overview of the macro data 
  Macro variables (CIS4)  Number of observations 
   GDPCAP  POP  GLOBAL  CIS4  CIS3 
Belgium  1.107  0.156  1.602  1,218  721 
Bulgaria  -1.922  -0.075  0.285  2,216  848 
Czech Republic  0.057  0.145  0.906  2,225  1,015 
Estonia  -0.759  -1.540  1.171  903  688 
Germany  0.980  1.888  -1.010  2,498  1,724 
Greece  0.458  0.207  -1.480  383  .. 
Hungary  -0.419  0.139  1.231  934  243 
Italy  0.849  1.585  -1.737  4,932  .. 
Latvia  -1.250  -1.088  -0.192  433  425 
Lithuania  -1.029  -0.758  -0.137  549  622 
Norway  1.687  -0.530  -0.850  1,326  1,512 
Portugal  0.024  0.160  -0.155  2,055  790 
Romania  ..  ..  ..  ..  1,793 
Slovakia  -0.687  -0.390  0.733  677  403 
Slovenia  0.245  -1.218  -0.115  653  .. 
Spain  0.660  1.318  -0.252  7,621  3,043 
Northern Europe  1.258  0.505  -0.086  5,042  3,957 
Southern Europe  0.498  0.818  -0.906  14,991  3,833 
New EU members  -0.721  -0.598  0.485  8,590  6,037 
 
 
Another figure presented in Table 3 that has not been mentioned so far is the number of 
observations per country. Overall, quality of the data has increased noticeably between CIS3 
and CIS4, resulting in much higher representativeness of the samples in most countries in the 
latter, so that we put relatively more weight on evidence based on the later dataset. Since the 
number of innovating firms is relatively low in some of the national samples, which poses a 
serious problem for estimating the regression models outlined below separately for each of 
them,  we  report  some  of  the  estimates  separately  for  regional  groupings  of  firms  from 
“Northern  Europe”  (Belgium,  Germany  and  Norway),  “Southern  Europe”  (Greece,  Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) and the former centrally planned countries that joined the EU during the 
last two rounds of enlargement under the heading of “New EU members” (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia  and  Romania).
12  Such 
grouping splits the sample into different geographical areas but most importantly also allows 
us to detect broad differences along the overall level of economic development  among other 
things. It is fully acknowledged that this is a relatively rough brush for detecting the national 
patterns, but these regional groups are only used to detect broad differences, which become 
examined in much more detail later.
 13  
                                                 
12 Some of the national samples are relatively small in proportion to size of the country, such as from Hungary in 
CIS3 and Greece in CIS4, though we still keep them in the analysis for comparative purposes. Also one needs to 
keep in mind that these are the innovative firms only, so that in countries with relatively low innovation rates the 
total samples are much larger. 
13 Firms from Greece in CIS3 and Romania in CIS4 could not be used because there is no information provided 
on innovation cooperation by location and type of the partner in these waves of the survey. Data from Italy and 
Slovenia have not been included in the CIS3 CD -ROM distributed by Eurostat. Hence, the regional groupings 
have different composition in CIS4 and CIS3; with the main difference that “Southern Europe” covers Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain in CIS4, but only Portugal and Spain in CIS3, which needs to be kept in mind, although 
this does not seem to undermine comparisons or the regional figures too much. 16 
 
4. Exploring evidence on the cooperation variables  
The aim of this section is to provide more detailed overview of the cooperation variables. Our 
focus here is on detecting main patterns in the data, on which we shall build in their closer 
examination as dependent variables in the following econometric estimates. First, we look at 
differences in the propensity to engage with external partners at home and abroad by countries 
and their groups. Second, we compare the propensity of firms to cooperate with different 
types of partners, and whether these tend to differ by the broad country groups. For this 
purpose, we run factor analysis on the battery of cooperation variables by the location and 
type of the partner to see how they relate to each other. In the last part of this section, finally, 
we  look  more  closely  at  the  perceived  value  of  the  various  types  of  partners,  which  is 
particularly relevant for understanding the (internal) within group cooperation of affiliated 
firms.    
 
Table 4 provides descriptive overview of the propensity of firms to external cooperation by 
location of the partner. About 31% of the firms engaged in innovation cooperation with at 
least one external partner (COtotEXT), of which roughly 15% cooperated only with a partner 
at  home  (COmnlEXT=1),  about  3%  cooperation  exclusively  with  a  partner  abroad 
(COmnlEXT=2)  and  14%  cooperated  with  both  domestic  and  foreign  partners 
(COmnlEXT=3); with marginal differences between CIS4 and CIS3 reported separately in the 
columns.  Arrangements  on  cooperation  with  partners  at  home  are  therefore  much  more 
prevalent than with those abroad. Although geography (or distance) clearly matters for the 
frequency of cooperation, so that the distinction between domestic and foreign partners seems 
to make sense, there is also a substantial overlap between them, because around four-fifths of 
firms that cooperate abroad also had a domestic partner. 
 
A brief look at the comparison between the groupings of countries presented in the lower part 
of the table, which proves to be instructive for this purpose, reveals a significant regional 
division.
  Albeit there is not  that much difference in  the propensity  of  firms  to  cooperate 
exclusively with domestic partners by the regions, arrangements on innovation cooperation 
that involve a foreign partner are more than two times less prevalent in Southern Europe as 
compared to the group of advanced countries in Northern Europe but somewhat surprisingly 
also as compared to the new EU member countries. In other words, Southern Europe comes 
out with generally lower cooperation rates predominantly because firms operating in these 
countries tend to venture much less often into cooperation abroad, i.e. for a reason these firms 
are much more inward looking than elsewhere. At the group level, furthermore, firms in the 
new EU member countries report even slightly higher propensity to foreign cooperation, and 
consequently in total, as compared to those in Northern Europe.  
 
Arguably, this is puzzling. Southern European countries have been described to have fragile 
national innovation systems for a long time; however, this has been understood to be even 
more the case of the “transition” innovation systems in the new EU member countries. Paasi 
(1998) found innovation systems in transitions countries relatively less efficient than in the 
market economies. Radosevic (2004) casts doubts about growth prospects of the Central and 
Eastern European countries, despite recently quite strong catching up, precisely because of 
fragmented innovation systems. Similarly, Högselius (2003) reported major gaps in systemic 
interactions among actors of the Estonian national innovation system, which he later held 
relevant  for  other  countries  in  the  region  too.  Even  though  the  difference  between  the 
Northern and Southern Europe conforms to the traditional story in the national innovation 
 17 
 
Table 4: Descriptive overview of COtotEXT and COmnlEXT by country 
  CIS4  CIS3 
  COtotEXT  COmnlEXT=  COtotEXT  COmnlEXT= 
  1  2  3  1  2  3 
Belgium  0.481  0.135  0.058  0.288  0.313  0.096  0.051  0.166 
Bulgaria  0.211  0.077  0.038  0.096  0.272  0.101  0.055  0.116 
Czech Republic  0.481  0.170  0.047  0.264  0.369  0.175  0.039  0.155 
Estonia  0.359  0.107  0.053  0.198  0.366  0.119  0.045  0.202 
Germany  0.286  0.159  0.012  0.115  0.282  0.177  0.010  0.095 
Greece  0.256  0.107  0.039  0.110  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Hungary  0.486  0.222  0.039  0.226  0.650  0.296  0.070  0.284 
Italy  0.177  0.138  0.005  0.034  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Latvia  0.432  0.141  0.039  0.252  0.506  0.136  0.080  0.289 
Lithuania  0.596  0.211  0.071  0.313  0.458  0.151  0.088  0.219 
Norway  0.452  0.155  0.027  0.270  0.415  0.211  0.034  0.170 
Portugal  0.240  0.112  0.017  0.112  0.271  0.133  0.037  0.101 
Romania  ..  ..  ..  ..  0.259  0.102  0.035  0.123 
Slovakia  0.446  0.074  0.046  0.326  0.365  0.112  0.040  0.213 
Slovenia  0.498  0.139  0.054  0.305  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Spain  0.278  0.180  0.019  0.079  0.217  0.111  0.011  0.095 
Northern Europe  0.377  0.152  0.027  0.198  0.338  0.175  0.027  0.137 
Southern Europe  0.239  0.155  0.015  0.070  0.228  0.115  0.016  0.096 
New EU members  0.402  0.136  0.046  0.220  0.352  0.132  0.050  0.170 
All countries  0.312  0.149  0.026  0.137  0.313  0.139  0.034  0.140 
 
Source: Eurostat (2007 and 2009). 
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system  literature,  namely  that  networks  of  cooperating  firms  tend  to  be  much  denser  in 
advanced countries, evidence from the new EU members does not fit into this pattern, perhaps 
only with exception of the “southern” (and the least advanced) Romania and Bulgaria, which 
noticeably  drags  down  the  regional  average.  So  why  do  firms  in  the  new  EU  member 
countries appear to be among the most cooperative in Europe? 
 
Admittedly, we should remind ourselves at this point that the dataset has been reduced to the 
innovating firms only, and that the share of innovation active firms is much lower in most of 
the new EU members than elsewhere. Only the minority of firms that innovate tend to be 
more cooperative, not the total population, which includes the majority of those, which do not 
even try to innovate. Yet this does not explain cooperativeness of the innovators. A tentative 
observation that we can perhaps offer at this point is that the reason why in CIS4 about 50% 
of firms reported to cooperate on innovation both in Belgium and the Czech Republic is likely 
to be quite different from each other. Even though the aggregate propensities to innovate 
might look similar, these numbers can capture quite different phenomena.  
 
If evidence on innovation cooperation recorded in the CIS data captured predominantly the 
virtuous systemic interactions highlighted in the innovation systems literature, then we should 
clearly observe a downward trend of cooperativeness along the level of development, i.e. by 
far the highest propensities in Northern Europe, then lower rates in Southern Europe and then 
equal or even lower rates in the new EU members. But this is not right. At the first glance, 
what emerges from the data is a complex non-linear relationship, inverted U-shape or perhaps 
S-shape curve, between cooperativeness and the level of development. Could it be that the 
nature  of  innovation  cooperation  differs  at  the  technology  frontier  as  compared  to  less 
advanced  countries?  Could  it  be  that  the  factors  that  motivate  firm  to  cooperate  at  the 
technological  frontier  are  quite  different  from  those  that  start  to  make  firms  even  more 
cooperative below a certain threshold of development? 
 
Table 5 shows how often firms engage with the different types of partners. Because there are 
many categories of the cooperation variables, for the sake of space we do report each country 
separately, but only present figures for the regional groups. Four main observations should be 
highlighted. First, the most frequent partners are other firms, namely suppliers and customer, 
hence  those  linked  to  the  respondent  by  up(down)ward  linkages  along  the  value  chain. 
Universities,  research  institutes  and  consultants  that  constitute  the  national  research 
infrastructure appear much less popular. Second, there seems to be a tendency for partners 
from the research infrastructure to be more often represented in the domestic cooperation 
arrangements, as compared to the foreign ones. In other words, distance matters much more 
for this type of partners. Third, firms in the new EU member countries tend to be relatively 
more involved with other firms, whereas firms in the North European countries tend to be 
noticeably more engaged as compared to the other regions in cooperation with universities. 
Finally, Southern Europe is lagging behind the other two regional groups in most of these 
figures, so that the overall propensity to cooperate is not driven by a certain type of partners 
only. 
 
About two-thirds of the cooperating firms tend to have more than one type of partner, and 
about a quarter of them combine even four or more (out of the six) different types of partners, 
i.e. not taking into account the distinction between domestic and foreign partners here. If a 
firm  ventures  into cooperation,  it  typically  gets  engaged in  networking relationships  with  
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Table 5: Average propensity of firms to cooperate with external partners by region and the type of partner 
  CIS4  CIS3 
















COtotSUP   0.212  0.242  0.137  0.325  0.198  0.189  0.116  0.256 
COtotCUS   0.171  0.230  0.094  0.270  0.176  0.170  0.124  0.213 
COtotCOM   0.111  0.120  0.071  0.175  0.107  0.091  0.073  0.139 
COtotINS   0.134  0.165  0.098  0.179  0.165  0.166  0.125  0.194 
COtotUNI   0.139  0.208  0.107  0.156  0.147  0.171  0.138  0.139 
COtotGMT   0.075  0.157  0.037  0.093  0.109  0.120  0.126  0.094 
COdomSUP   0.163  0.180  0.117  0.234  0.136  0.142  0.078  0.168 
COdomCUS   0.134  0.180  0.080  0.201  0.132  0.138  0.083  0.159 
COdomCOM   0.079  0.076  0.056  0.120  0.076  0.070  0.038  0.105 
COdomINS   0.115  0.139  0.089  0.147  0.135  0.151  0.093  0.153 
COdomUNI   0.130  0.191  0.102  0.143  0.134  0.161  0.126  0.125 
COdomGMT   0.067  0.142  0.034  0.080  0.096  0.113  0.109  0.079 
COforSUP   0.103  0.135  0.042  0.192  0.110  0.094  0.060  0.151 
COforCUS   0.090  0.136  0.036  0.158  0.088  0.080  0.066  0.107 
COforCOM   0.055  0.069  0.026  0.097  0.053  0.039  0.047  0.068 
COforINS   0.044  0.066  0.022  0.067  0.067  0.052  0.062  0.081 
COforUNI   0.032  0.069  0.020  0.030  0.037  0.045  0.037  0.034 
COforGMT   0.017  0.040  0.008  0.020  0.029  0.027  0.039  0.024 
 
Source: Eurostat (2007 and 2009). 
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several types of organizations simultaneously, not just one type at a time. And this leads us to 
the question whether some combinations tend to be more prevalent than others. To find out 
“unconditional”  relations  between  them,  we  perform  exploratory  factor  analysis  on  the 
cooperation variables by location and type of partners. Table 6 presents the results.
14 Only 
two relevant factors were detected explaining 73.4% and 72.4% of the total variance in CIS3 
and CIS4, respectively.
15  So-called factor loadings, which are the correlation coefficients 
between the indicators (rows) and the retained principal factors (columns), are reported in the 
upper part of the table.  
 
Table 6: Exploratory factor analysis on cooperation by the location and type of the 
partner 
 
  CIS4  CIS3 
  Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 1  Factor 2 
COdomSUP   0.261  0.778  0.280  0.784 
COdomCUS   0.377  0.789  0.326  0.807 
COdomCOM   0.245  0.760  0.288  0.794 
COdomINS   0.354  0.776  0.357  0.803 
COdomUNI   0.504  0.666  0.484  0.705 
COdomGMT   0.506  0.660  0.443  0.675 
COforSUP   0.620  0.531  0.716  0.400 
COforCUS   0.659  0.529  0.742  0.407 
COforCOM   0.678  0.497  0.783  0.378 
COforINS   0.794  0.364  0.844  0.321 
COforUNI   0.874  0.258  0.812  0.312 
COforGMT   0.875  0.227  0.839  0.248 
1
st eigenvalue  7.704  7.662 
2
nd eigenvalue  0.987  1.142 
3
rd eigenvalue  0.472  0.509 
4
th eigenvalue  0.205  0.192 
5
th eigenvalue  0.137  0.113 
6
th eigenvalue  0.071  0.060 
% of total variance explained   72.4  73.4 
N  28,623  13,827 
 
Note: Principal factors extraction method; orthogonal varimax rotation.  
 
                                                 
14  Since  all  of  these  variables  are  dummies,  we  use  the  so-called  tetrachoric  correlations  in  the  factoring 
procedure  (Kolenikov,  Angeles  2004),  which  are  more  suitable  for  handling  binary  variables  than  the 
conventional correlation coefficients. 
15 According to the most widely used Kaiser criterion, only principal factors with eingenvalue higher than one 
should be retained, because these account for at least as much as the equivalent of one original variable, though 
the issue on how many factor to retain is not clearly identified in factors analysis. Another criterion, the so-called 
“scree” test, recommends plotting eigenvalues in a line plot and finding the place where the smooth decrease of 
the eigenvalues appears to level off, because to the right of this point, presumably, we find only “factorial scree”. 
Since there are two factors with eigenvalue higher than one in CIS3 and the second eigenvalue in CIS4 is just 
around one, and the scree test suggest retaining two factors in each case, we decided to keep two factor scores in 
both. In other words, we do not keep only one in CIS4, which is strictly speaking suggested by the Kaiser 
criterion, so that the results can be easily compared between the two estimates. 21 
 
The  main  outcome  is  that  there  is  a  strong  common  dimension  in  the  data  for  firms  to 
cooperate or not, regardless of the location or type of the partner organization. As far as there 
is a latent structure along these lines, if any at all, this refers to the distinction between the 
domestic and foreign cooperation partners, which tend to load together more highly on one of 
the principal factors than the other, although there is still quite strong overlap between them 
too. But differences between the types of partners within the realm of domestic on one hand 
and foreign cooperation on the other hand come out to be fairly negligible. In other words, 
this result suggests that for most firms the different types of partners, including the domestic 
and foreign ones, seem to be highly compatible with each other. Overall, this shows that there 
seems to be a strong “cooperate or not” behavioural pattern in the data. 
 
Table 7: Average propensity of cooperating firms to combine different types of partners 
 






COtotGP  ..  0.400  0.434  0.418  0.428  0.410  0.470 
COtotSUP  0.700  ..  0.763  0.760  0.743  0.646  0.754 
COtotCUS  0.612  0.615  ..  0.737  0.642  0.613  0.745 
COtotCOM  0.381  0.396  0.477  ..  0.479  0.432  0.553 
COtotINS  0.472  0.469  0.502  0.579  ..  0.566  0.691 
COtotUNI  0.471  0.424  0.499  0.544  0.590  ..  0.815 
COtotGMT  0.291  0.267  0.327  0.376  0.388  0.439  .. 






COtotGP  ..  0.425  0.428  0.457  0.443  0.431  0.452 
COtotSUP  0.661  ..  0.720  0.774  0.719  0.641  0.667 
COtotCUS  0.592  0.640  ..  0.780  0.636  0.625  0.659 
COtotCOM  0.385  0.419  0.475  ..  0.458  0.434  0.471 
COtotINS  0.580  0.605  0.602  0.712  ..  0.638  0.674 
COtotUNI  0.502  0.480  0.526  0.600  0.567  ..  0.762 
COtotGMT  0.392  0.372  0.413  0.486  0.447  0.568  .. 
N  1,757  2,738  2,434  1,481  2,304  2,048  1,526 
 
 
Somewhat more descriptively the underlying combinations between the types of partners are 
presented in Table 7, where we focus on the cooperating firms only. Sub-samples of those 
firms  cooperating  with  the  respective  type  of  partners  delineate  the  columns,  while  the 
proportion of these engaging with the other types of partners is reported in the rows. In other 
words,  this  shows the  frequency  of different  pairs of partners. For example,  in  the CIS4 
dataset, 64.6% of firms that cooperated with a university (COtotUNI) combined this link with 
having at the same time a joined project with a non-affiliated supplier (COtotSUP). Some of 
the pairs are obviously less frequent than others, especially those with competitors or public 
research institutes, but from a bird’s eye view, as already detected above, the different types 
of partners seem to be highly compatible with each other.
16 
                                                 
16 It should be noted, however, that these links do not necessarily refer to the same innovation project. In other 
words, these cooperation arrangements might have been forged separately in different projects within the firm. 
For example, consider a large firm with multiple divisions, of which one has cooperation with a university, while 
another one with a customer, so that the firm as a whole answers positively on both types of partners, but they 
might never meet in the same project together. 22 
 
 
So far we have focused only on the external partners. If COdomGP and COforGP are added 
into the factor analysis presented above, however, they come out with very similar pattern of 
loadings  as  the  external  partners,  i.e.  high  loadings  with  the  other  domestic,  respectively 
foreign types of partners. COtotGP does not look much different from the other variables in 
the previous table either, which suggests that the variables for internal cooperation do not 
behave significantly different from the others. Yet, it is necessary to exclude these internal 
partners from definition of the dependent variable, if the predictors for being part of the group 




5. Econometric results 
 
Following the issues outlined above, we estimate empirical models that predict cooperative 
behaviour of the innovative firms. Depending on the specification, the various CO indicators 
explored in the previous section represent the dependent variables, while the battery of firm-
level predictors LARGE, MEDIUM, DOMGP, FORGP, EXP, R&D, INFO, PROT, OBS, the 
set  of  IND  and  NAT  contextual  dummies  for  sectoral  and  national  differences  and  the 
country-level predictors GDPCAP, POP and GLOBAL introduced earlier in the paper appear 
on the right hand side. It should be stressed, moreover, that the estimates do not suffer from a 
serious problem of multicollinearity, because these explanatory variables are not excessively 
correlated to each other, which confirms that these predictors capture distinct phenomena; see 
Appendix 1 for correlation tables between the firm-level predictors. 
 
Since  the  dependent  variables  refer  to  binary  responses,  we  use  maximum  likelihood 
procedures to estimate various probit (and logit) models. Besides the basic univariate probit 
regression for a  single  binary  response, multivariate probit estimates  need to  be used for 
categorical variables with correlated outcomes, and multinomial probit is required for discrete 
categorical dependent variables. To put national differences under closer scrutiny, we also 
estimate a multilevel  (or hierarchical) specification  with  firms  at  level-1 and countries at 
level-2  of  some  of  these  models.  Each  of  the  regressions  is  delineated,  explained  and 
discussed, including the exact specification, before the results are presented. A majority of the 
estimates were performed in Stata 9.2, except of the multilevel models, for which we had to 
use specialized statistical software Hierarchical Linear and Non-linear Modeling (HLM) 6.06. 
 
We divide this section into three parts, each focusing on a different set of dependent variables. 
Section  5.1  sets  the  stage  for  the  debate  by  focusing  on  the  general  variable  of  external 
cooperation, which provides benchmark estimates of relationships between the variables, but 
also gives us the opportunity to explain the methodology of multilevel estimates on the base 
of this basic model. Section 5.2 dives more deeply in the distinction between cooperation with 
domestic  and  foreign  external  partners,  which  is  the  central  issue  of  this  paper.  Finally, 
Section 5.3 looks more closely at cooperation by the types of external partners. 
 
An important limitation of the analysis that needs to be emphasized is that not much could 
have been done about a potential endogeneity of the estimated coefficients mainly due to a 
lack of valid instruments in the dataset, which is admittedly a chronic problem for empirical 
research  based  on  these  surveys.  Any  interpretation  in  terms  of  causality  between  the 
explanatory and dependent variables should be therefore put forward with caution. Another 
related limitation given by the dataset in hand is the cross-sectional nature of the analysis, 
because  the  CIS3  and  CIS4  datasets  cannot  be  connected  due  to  confidentiality  of  the 
respondents. It remains an important challenge for future research to address these caveats if 
better  data  become  available,  such  as  those  being  gathered  for  the  purpose  of  follow  up 
studies based on more detailed national evidence from the Czech Republic, Norway and the 
United Kingdom in the next phase of the GlobInn project. 
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5.1 Setting up the stage: Cooperate or not?  
In  this  section,  we  develop  models  that  predict  the  overall  cooperativeness  of  firms  on 
innovation. COtotEXT is the dependent variable. The aim is to indentify general patterns of 
the cooperative behaviour of firms, which provides benchmark results that should help us to 
understand what is specific about the more detailed cooperation variables examined in more 
detail below. First, we estimate a standard probit model that explains the propensity of firms 
to cooperate as follows:  
 
(1) P (COtotEXT=1  ) = 0 + 1LARGE + 2MEDIUM + 3DOMGP + 4FORGP + 5EXP 








n 11 NAT + ε 
where  IND = 1 ... m  is  the  set  of  industry  dummies,  NAT = 1 ... n  is  the  set  of  country 
dummies and ε in the residual.  
 
Tables  9.1  and  9.2  present  the  first  set  of  results  based  on  the  CIS4  and  CIS3  datasets, 
respectively. In the first column, we start by estimating the model on the full sample of firms 
from  all  countries  together,  and  then  in  the  other  columns  for  comparative  purposes  we 
estimate  the  model  separately  for  the  broad  regional  groups.  The  aim  is  to  explore 
heterogeneity of the estimated coefficients depending on the context that spans from the most 
advanced group of “Northern Europe”, to “Southern Europe” and finally to the least advanced 
group of the “New EU members”. Although the set of IND and NAT dummies is included in 
all of the estimates, we do not report their results in the table for the sake of brevity, because 
these variables are just used to control for the context-specific effects.  
 
All of the predictors have highly significant and expected signs in the estimates based on the 
full  sample,  which  confirms  that  the  model  is  relevant  for  explaining  the  cooperative 
behaviour of firms. Size of the firm is important to control for due to scale advantages of 
various kinds involved in the decision of firms to venture into innovation cooperation, so that 
the  effects  of  LARGE  and  MEDIUM  dummy  variables  are  in  line  with  the  expectations 
positive and with descending magnitude of the coefficient. Also R&D, INFO, PROT and 
OBS, which capture various resources, capabilities and perceptions of firms with regards to 
the innovation process, tend to be for obvious reasons already discussed above positively 
associated to cooperativeness of firms. R&D appears to be have the strongest effect given by 
magnitude  of  the  estimated  coefficient,  which  underlines  the  importance  of  internal 
technological capabilities of firms.  
 
Affiliated firms, identified by the DOMGP and FORGP dummies, are more likely to engage 
in cooperation as compared to independent companies, even with the external (non-affiliated) 
partners, because the organizational proximity to parent companies and other firms in the 
group helps them to overcome cognitive, geographical or other barriers that might stand in the 
way,  and  therefore  lubricates  the  propensity  to  find  relevant  partners  for  cooperation.  It 
seems, furthermore, that this difference tends to increase with the decreasing development 
level of the country where the firms are located. Along the ownership divide by far the largest 
difference is observed in the new EU member countries, whereas the smallest gap came out in 
the North European region, where in most cases these variables even ceased to be statistically 
significant at the conventional levels.  25 
 
Table 9.1: Probit results for COtotEXT (CIS4) 
 








Constant  -1.084 (0.054)***  -1.251 (0.107)***  -1.384 (0.089)***  -1.428 (0.060)*** 
LARGE  0.372 (0.025)***  0.497 (0.058)***  0.348 (0.037)***  0.367 (0.045)*** 
MEDIUM  0.082 (0.020)***  0.119 (0.049)**  0.047 (0.028)*  0.145 (0.035)*** 
DOMGP  0.242 (0.022)***  0.061 (0.048)  0.244 (0.030)***  0.401 (0.045)*** 
FORGP  0.163 (0.025)***  0.056 (0.062)  0.123 (0.040)***  0.212 (0.040)*** 
EXP  0.119 (0.020)***  0.189 (0.048)***  0.100 (0.029)***  0.112 (0.035)*** 
R&D  0.535 (0.020)***  0.773 (0.054)***  0.529 (0.028)***  0.448 (0.034)*** 
INFO  0.208 (0.020)***  0.333 (0.049)***  0.166 (0.029)***  0.219 (0.035)*** 
PROT  0.292 (0.018)***  0.359 (0.043)***  0.275 (0.025)***  0.257 (0.034)*** 
OBS  0.116 (0.017)***  0.127 (0.042)***  0.147 (0.024)***  0.058 (0.030)** 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald 
2  4,085.85***  908.85***  1,424.78***  1,308.65*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.13  0.16  0.10  0.12 
N  28,623  5,042  14,991  8,590 
 




Table 9.2: Probit results for COtotEXT (CIS3) 
 








Constant  -1.808 (0.073)***  -1.776 (0.116)***  -1.799 (0.115)***  -1.392 (0.091)*** 
LARGE  0.528 (0.038)***  0.466 (0.064)***  0.850 (0.077)***  0.414 (0.062)*** 
MEDIUM  0.253 (0.030)***  0.217 (0.056)***  0.419 (0.064)***  0.222 (0.044)*** 
DOMGP  0.334 (0.033)***  0.135 (0.051)***  0.315 (0.062)***  0.491 (0.063)*** 
FORGP  0.211 (0.038)***  0.083 (0.068)  -0.175 (0.081)**  0.429 (0.057)*** 
EXP  0.170 (0.028)***  0.152 (0.050)***  0.281 (0.061)***  0.120 (0.043)*** 
R&D  0.436 (0.027)***  0.554 (0.056)***  0.562 (0.059)***  0.311 (0.038)*** 
INFO  0.178 (0.028)***  0.182 (0.053)***  0.180 (0.059)***  0.182 (0.040)*** 
PROT  0.236 (0.026)***  0.338 (0.047)***  0.164 (0.052)***  0.216 (0.039)*** 
OBS  0.186 (0.025)***  0.184 (0.046)***  0.141 (0.051)***  0.216 (0.038)*** 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald 
2  1,953.39***  509.01***  598.55***  809.87*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.13  0.11  0.18  0.10 
N  13,827  3,957  3,833  6,037 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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Another important finding that can be seen from the regional comparison is that the effects of 
the capability variables broadly follow an opposite tendency, especially for the R&D variable 
in the CIS4 sample, even though for the other coefficients the decreasing trend along the level 
of development does not follow such a straightforward trajectory. In other words, R&D seems 
to be much more intimately related to cooperation in more advanced environments, whereas 
organization  proximity  matters  relatively  more  in  less  advanced  countries.  Generally 
speaking, these results show that there is a remarkable tendency for the estimated coefficients 
to  differ  across  the  development  level  of  the  country  where  the  firms  operate,  which  is 
arguably a substantial finding that deserves to be further examined in the following. 
 
Nevertheless,  there  is  more  analytical,  efficient  and  also  elegant  way  to  econometrically 
examine  differences  of  the estimated coefficients  across countries. So far one of  a major 
assumptions  of  the  econometric  framework  has  been  that  the  individual  observations  are 
independent from each other, or in other words, that these firms share the same homogenous 
environment. If a hierarchical structure of data exits, however, units belonging to the same 
group  tend  to  have  correlated  residuals  and  the  independence  assumption  is  likely  to  be 
violated.  By  relaxing  this  assumption,  so-called  multilevel  modeling  provides  statistically 
more efficient estimates, which are more “conservative”, as Goldstein (2003) puts it, than 
those ignoring the hierarchical nature of data.
17 
 
A partial solution to account for the compositional effects,  to which we have optioned for 
above, is to ignore the random variability associated with the higher-level factors and include 
into the estimate fixed effect dummies that correspond to the hierarchical structure of the data, 
such as the dummies for location of firms in different countries. Using dummies might be a 
useful quick-fix solution, if the purpose only is to control for the compositional effects, as we 
have done,  but it is of a  limited  help if the prime interest   of the study  is to deepen 
understanding  of  the  higher -level  effects  and  their  cross-level  interactions  themselves. 
Although we may detect rough patterns of the structure, a dummy is a “catch-all” variable for 
which we can only speculate what it really represents.  
 
Apart from the statistical consequences, a proper recognition of data hierarchies allows us to 
examine  new  lines  of  questions.  Using  the  example  of  firms  in  countries,  the  multilevel 
approach enables the researcher to properly explore the extent to which differences between 
countries are accountable for outcomes at the firm level. It is also possible to investigate the 
mechanics by which the national factors operate at the firm level and the extent to which these 
effects differ for different kinds of firms. For example, we may analyse whether differences in 
the development level of the country are more important for smaller than larger firms, for 
foreign affiliates more than domestic companies or for firms with advanced capabilities more 
than  those  without  them.  Such  research  questions  can  be  straightforwardly  examined  by 
multilevel  modeling,  but  can  be  neither  easily  nor  properly  examined  by  the  standard 
methods.
18 
                                                 
17 It should be noted, however, that not only multilevel modeling relaxes the standard independence assumption 
on residual terms. Spatial autocorrelation techniques have been developed to produce valid statistical inferences 
if errors tend to be correlated regionally (Fotheringham et al. 2000). Also survey design and analytical tools 
recognize the need to take into account the hierarchical structure of the population (Skinner et al. 1989). Even 
though  these  procedures  are  deemed  to  be  necessary  to  obtain  efficient  estimates,  the  higher-level  effects 
typically do not merit a serious interest themselves. Only multilevel modeling allows us to look closely at the 
patterns and consequences of hierarchical structure of the phenomena in question. 
18 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time multilevel modeling is used to study cooperation on 
innovation. So far multilevel modeling has been rarely  used to study  innovation; with the exception of recent 
papers  by  Srholec  (2008,  2009b )  that  used  this  methodology  to  study  national  and  regional  effects  on 28 
 
 
A multilevel sometimes also called a hierarchical, random coefficient or mixed-effect model 
relates  a  dependent  variable  to  predictor  variables  at  more  than  one  level  (Luke  2004). 
Suppose a multilevel model has 2-level structure with firms at level-1 nested in countries at 
level-2.  The  aim  is  to  explain  firm’s  likelihood  to  cooperate  on  innovation  by  factors 
operating at the firm and country levels. COtotEXT is the dependent variable at the level-1, 
the vector of firm-level dummies for LARGE, MEDIUM, DOMGP, FORGP, EXP, R&D, 
INFO, PROT, OBS are the level-1 predictors, while the GDPCAP country-level variable is 
the level-2 predictor, which is included to test for differences of the coefficients along the 
overall level of development. Again, the set of industry dummies IND is included too, but 
country dummies NAT do not appear in this model, because the country-level differences are 
instead captured by the GDPCAP variable and the set of country-level residuals representing 
the unobserved heterogeneity across  countries.  A full specification of  the logit multilevel 
model is the following: 
 
(2) Level-1 model: 
P (COtotEXTij=1  j) = ij 
Log ij / (1 - ij) = 0j + 1j LARGEij + 2j MEDIUMij + 3j DOMGPij + 4j FORGPij 




m 10 INDi 
Level-2 model: 
0j = 00 + 01 GDPCAPj + u0j 
1j = 10 + 11 GDPCAPj + u1j 
2j = 20 + 21 GDPCAPj + u2j 
3j = 30 + 31 GDPCAPj + u3j 
4j = 40 + 41 GDPCAPj + u4j 
5j = 50 + 51 GDPCAPj + u5j 
6j = 60 + 61 GDPCAPj + u6j 
7j = 70 + 71 GDPCAPj + u7j 
8j = 80 + 81 GDPCAPj + u8j 
9j = 90 + 91 GDPCAPj + u9j 
 
where i denotes a firm, j denotes a country, 00 … 91 are fixed effects and u0j … u9j are 
random effects, or residuals in other words, of which 00 is the estimated grand mean of the 
log-odds of firms to cooperate on innovation across countries, 01 is the country effect on the 
intercept, u0j tells us that the countries vary around that grand mean, 10, 20, 30 ... 90 are the 
estimated means of the firm-level slopes across countries, 11, 21,  31  … 91 are the cross-level 
interactions between the firm- and country-level predictors and u1j, u2j, u3j ... u9j  indicate that 
the firm-level slopes vary not only as a function of the predictors but also as a function of 
unobserved  country effects; all of  the random  effects  are  assumed to  be sampled from  a 
normal distribution with expected zero mean and variance = 
2
u.
19 Finally, 10m indicate the 
                                                                                                                                                         
innovativeness of firms, and the paper by Goedhuys and Srholec (2009) that examined the extent to which 
various macro factors affect returns on technological capabilities of firms, though the cooperative behaviour of 
firms has not been considered in these papers. 
19 Note that there is not a term for the level -1 residual, because for a binary outcome the variance is completely 
determined by the population mean, and thus the residual is not a separate term to be estimated (Luke 2004, pg. 
55) 29 
 
estimated fixed effects of the industry dummies, which for the sake of tractability are not 
allowed to differ across countries.
20 
 
At level-1 the equation refers to firm-level relationships. If the level-2 equations were not 
specified, the level-1 relationships could have been estimated as a number of standard single-
level models separately for each country. A multilevel model emerges, if we let the intercept 
0j and slopes 1j ... 9j to become random variables. Since the level-2 effects are identified by 
the  subscript  j,  we  have  a  hierarchical  system  of  regression  equations  at  different  levels, 
where we allow each country to have a different average outcome and a different effect of the 
level-1 predictors on the outcome. Although a different firm-level model is delineated for 
each  country,  the  level-2  equations  tell  us  that  the  estimated  intercept  and  slopes  differ 
simultaneously across countries, in other words we assume the level-1 relationships to be 
influenced by the country effects. 
 
Table 10 gives the results.
21 We estimate the model from bottom up. First, we consider a 
“basic”  model  with  only  the  level-1  predictors  and  let  the  level-2  effects  to  be  random 
variables. Second, we examine a so-called “intercept-as-outcome” model, which includes the 
level-2 predictor only for the intercept. And finally, in the last column, we report estimates of 
the full “slopes-as-outcomes” model outlined above, which relates the level-2 predictor to 
both the intercept and slopes. To improve interpretability of the results, we standardized the 
level-2 predictor GDPCAP by deducting mean and dividing by standard deviation, so that this 
variable enters the estimate with mean of zero and standard deviation equal to one too. Since 
the other variables are dummies, all of the predictors have a meaningful zero-point, which 
simplifies interpretation of the estimated parameters. Unfortunately, the CIS3 data includes 
only  13  countries,  which  proved  unsatisfactory  for  this  purpose,  so  that  we  estimate  the 
multilevel model on the CIS4 sample only. 
 
Results of the basic model are presented in the first column in Table 10. Even though there 
are no country-level predictors, the estimated random effects reported in units of standard 
deviation reveal to which extent the firm-level relationships differ by country.
 Note that a 
useful characteristic of the standard deviation is that for normally distributed data about 68% 
of the observations concentrate less than one standard deviation from the mean, and about 
95% of the observations lie between two standard deviations below and above the mean. 
Overall, there is a lot of variability across countries. All of the firm-level fixed effects come 
out highly statistically significant and with the expected signs, but the estimated coefficients 
appear  widely  distributed  around  the  mean  highlighting  their  sensitivity  to  the  national 
framework conditions. 
 
For example, it can be easily calculated that the effect of FORGP is estimated in the range of 
[0.112, 0.426] for 68% of the countries and in the range of [-0.045, 0.583] for 95% of them, 
which indicates that there are countries where this coefficient is fairly close to zero, or could 
even  turn  out  to  be  negative  in  extreme  cases.  In  other  words,  the  difference  in  
 
                                                 
20 10m can be allowed to differ by country by adding other m-1 equations to the country-level layer of the model, 
but this would substantially complicate the estimate. Obviously, there is a limit to how  many country-level 
parameters can be estimated in a sample consisting of 15 countries only. 
21  As discussed by Goldstein (2003), the presence of more than one residual term makes the traditional 
estimation procedures inapplicable, so that specialized maximum likelihood procedures must be used to estimate 
these models, for which we have used those proposed by Raudenbush et al. (2004) and developed in specialized 
statistical software Hierarchical Linear and Non-linear Modeling (HLM) version 6.06. 30 
 
Table 10: Multilevel results for COtotEXT (CIS4) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Fixed Effects:       
For Interceptij (0j)       
Interceptij (00)  -2.167 (0.217)***  -2.172 (0.179)***  -2.166 (0.184)*** 
GDPCAPj (01)  ..  -0.428 (0.088)***  -0.492 (0.182)** 
For LARGEij slope (1j)       
LARGEij (10)  0.657 (0.085)***  0.662 (0.085)***  0.651 (0.076)*** 
GDPCAPj (11)  ..  ..  0.166 (0.081)* 
For MEDIUMij slope (2j)       
MEDIUMij (20)  0.213 (0.063)***  0.214 (0.061)***  0.211 (0.064)*** 
GDPCAPj (21)  ..  ..  0.007 (0.067) 
For DOMGPij slope (3j)     
DOMGPij (30)  0.495 (0.076)***  0.483 (0.075)***  0.516 (0.048)*** 
GDPCAPj (31)  ..  ..  -0.246 (0.052)*** 
For FORGPij slope (4j)       
FORGPij (40)  0.269 (0.060)***  0.261 (0.060)***  0.270 (0.055)*** 
GDPCAPj (41)  ..  ..  -0.104 (0.059)* 
For EXPij slope (5j)       
EXPij (50)  0.223 (0.067)***  0.221 (0.066)***  0.225 (0.066)*** 
GDPCAPj (51)  ..  ..  0.022 (0.067) 
For R&Dij slope (6j)     
R&Dij (60)  0.886 (0.090)***  0.898 (0.089)***  0.889 (0.067)*** 
GDPCAPj (61)  ..  ..  0.231 (0.071)*** 
For PROTij slope (7j)     
PROTij (70)  0.451 (0.053)***  0.463 (0.051)***  0.448 (0.049)*** 
GDPCAPj (71)  ..  ..  0.118 (0.051)** 
For INFOij slope (8j)     
INFOij (80)  0.386 (0.068)***  0.382 (0.067)***  0.384 (0.070)*** 
GDPCAPj (81)  ..  ..  0.017 (0.073) 
For OBSij slope (9j)       
OBSij (90)  0.156 (0.038)***  0.164 (0.038)***  0.157 (0.034)*** 
GDPCAPj (91)  ..  ..  0.081 (0.036)** 
       
Industry dummies (10m)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Random effects:       
Interceptij (u0j)  0.797  0.640  0.660 
LARGEij slope (u1j)  0.269  0.273  0.230 
MEDIUMij slope (u2j)  0.198  0.193  0.203 
DOMGPij slope (u3j)  0.245  0.245  0.074 
FORGPij slope (u4j)  0.157  0.155  0.121 
EXPij slope (u5j)  0.208  0.205  0.207 
R&Dij slope (u6j)  0.314  0.309  0.207 
PROTij slope (u7j)  0.158  0.145  0.131 
INFOij slope (u8j)  0.213  0.208  0.222 
OBSij slope (u9j)  0.093  0.089  0.053 
Index of dispersion  1.000  1.000  1.001 
Level-1 observations  28,623  28,623  28,623 
Level-2 groups  15  15  15 
 
Note: Non-linear unit-specific model with the logit link function; restricted maximum likelihood (PQL) estimate; 
coefficients and standard errors in brackets reported for the fixed effects; standard deviations reported for the 
random effects; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 31 
 
cooperativeness on innovation between foreign affiliates and non-affiliated domestic firms 
largely depends on the national framework conditions, in which the firms operate. A closer 
look at distribution of the R&D coefficient reveals that this effect is estimated to be in the 
range of [0.572, 1.200] for 68% of the countries and in the range of [0.258, 1.514] for 95% of 
them, so that is some countries cooperation of firms on innovation seems to be intimately 
related to their R&D capabilities, while in a different national environment this link can be 
quite weak. Similar conclusions can be drawn for most of the other firm-level effects.
22 
 
Since non-zero  random effects  indicate un-modeled variability  across countries, we shall 
attempt to reduce t hese residuals by including the level -2 predictor. Next, we therefore 
estimate the intercept-as-outcome model, which incorporates the  GDPCAP variable into the 
model as a predictor of the level-1 intercept, but let the level-1 effects remain “unconditional” 
at the country level. As has been shown in the descriptive statistics above, there seems to be a 
tendency for the cooperativeness of firms to be inversely related in a non-linear fashion to the 
development level of the country, but we could have not really derived too much from this 
observation, because other relevant factors have not been controlled for. Nevertheless, in this 
estimate we do just that.  
 
As can be seen in the second column in Table 10, this preliminary observation is firmly 
supported by the econometric results. GDPCAP comes out with highly statistically significant 
and  negative  effect  on  the  intercept,  in  other  words  on  the  estimated  mean  of  firms  to 
cooperate on innovation, even after properly controlling for the relevant firm-level effects and 
allowing for the random country differences in a multilevel framework. Just to reiterate this 
major  finding,  these  figures  econometrically  confirm  that  firms  in  relatively  less  develop 
countries are more likely to cooperate on innovation. Arguably, this is a fairly surprising 
conclusion, as according to the national innovation systems literature there should be denser 
networks of collaborating firms in more advanced countries, so that we should find exactly 
the opposite tendency.  
 
Nevertheless, one possible explanation why the general effect of GDPCAP on the intercept 
came out significant could be that we did not control for the cross-level interaction terms. In 
other words, the effect of GDPCAP could primarily depend on characteristics of the firms 
themselves. If we account for this possibility, there may not be a central tendency detected 
along these lines anymore. To test for this hypothesis, we allow the GDPCAP variable to 
influence also slopes of the level-1 predictors in the full “slopes-as-outcomes” model, where 
we examine not only whether this variable directly explains the intercept, but also whether the 
development  level  of  the  country  exerts  an  indirect  effect  by  mediating  the  firm-level 
relationships. Given the large random differences in effects of the firm-level predictors across 
countries detected above, the idea is to test to which extent the GDPCAP variable accounts 
for these differences.  
 
Table 10 gives results of the full model in the last column. Several statistically significant 
cross-level interactions have been detected, of which two main observations clearly stand out. 
First, there is the negative and highly significant interaction between the GDPCAP country 
variable and the DOMGP variable for domestically affiliated firms. To a lesser extent this is 
the case also for the interaction between GDPCAP and FORGP, although this effect is much 
less  significant.  Since  the  sign  of  these  interactions  is  negative,  this  result  suggests  that 
                                                 
22 Note that the predicted log-odds can be converted to an odds by exp(ij) and to the predicted probability ij by 
expij/(1+expij). 32 
 
organizational  proximity  to  other  firms  tends  to  be  much  more  intimately  related  to 
cooperation for firms operating in less advanced countries. Second, there are the positive and 
statistically  significant  interaction  terms  between  GDPCAP  of  the  country  and  the  R&D, 
PROT and OBS firm-level dummies, so that the positive effect of these resources, capabilities 
and  perceptions  increases  with  development  level  of  the  country.
23  In  other  words, 
organization proximity drives cooperativeness of firms in less  advanced countries, while the 
latter capability factors matter much more in advanced economies.  
 
Arguably, internal resources, capabilities and perceptions of firms, matter less for cooperation 
in the context of less advanced countries, because the process of innovation itself, to which 
these cooperation arrangements refer to, tends to be more focused on imitation, given by only 
new to the firm product and processes, rather than on innovation in a strict sense, as novelty 
for the market or even the whole world. Naturally, this “cooperation on imitation” with other 
organizations is more geared towards the absorption of existing knowledge, aimed at learning 
from others, and therefore relatively less intensive on own unique resources of firms. Yet a 
flipside  interpretation  of  this  tendency  could  be  that  firms  in  less  advanced  countries 
cooperate more often with other organizations to actually make up for limited investment in 
their  internal  innovation  capabilities.  For  example,  this  could  be  a  situation  when  firms 
cooperate with a university, because they cannot afford (or are not willing) to maintain a 
regular R&D department by themselves. Arguably, this interpretation puts these arrangements 
into a substantially different light, as further elaborated below. 
 
Furthermore, all of the less advanced countries included in this study, it should be noticed, are 
former centrally planned economies, hence the result that affiliated firms, particularly those 
part of a domestic group, tend to be more cooperative in this context points to a possible 
“transition” element. Could it be that this past experience is still imprinted in how these firms 
innovate?  Could  it  be  that  their  cooperation  routines  with  other  organizations  developed 
during the long period of central planning have survived the transition process? Could it be 
that  the  grouped  firms  in  these  countries,  possibly  remnants  of  the  old  conglomerates, 
innovate relatively more collectively for historical reasons? One should bear in mind that 
these surveys refer to periods at the turn of the century and early into this decade, which was 
still only about ten to fifteen years since the regime change in these countries. Admittedly, 
however, we do not have a clear measure of this effect, so that this “transition” interpretation 
of the results requires a relatively long stretch of imagination, and more research is clearly 
needed to establish whether there is the case or not. 
 
After taking on board the cross-level interactions, statistical significance of the GDPCAP 
effect  on  the  intercept  has  decreased  from  1%  to  5%,  while  the  magnitude  has  slightly 
increased, which confirms that the interaction terms are relevant to control for in order to 
properly isolate the general tendency along these lines, but at the same time that the pattern of 
increasing cooperativeness of firms with decreasing development level of the country remains 
relatively strong. So how could this be? First, the historical reasons related to central planning 
just discussed above may play a role in this direct effect too, if firms in the less advanced new 
EU member countries generally inherited relatively more collectivistic approach to innovation 
from the past. Second, this points to the fact that this result can be driven by composition of 
                                                 
23 Arguably, one would expect that firms become relatively more cooperative because of the obstacles in the 
context of less developed countries, hence the interaction term between GDPCAP and OBS variables should be 
negative, but this expectation is clearly not supported by the data. All of the cross-level interactions with this 
variable, however, came out insignificant in the multinomial multilevel estimate below, so that this effect is not 
robust to specification of the model, and we are therefore not discussing it in more detail here. 33 
 
the sample, because more than half of countries in this data are from Central and Eastern 
Europe, so that this could be a regional, not a global, trend. It well might be that beyond some 
threshold of GDPCAP the relationship to cooperativeness of firms disappears or even reverses 
into negative, but we just do not observe this here. Nevertheless, given these results, we can 
say with some confidence that this pattern is real in this selection of countries.  
 
Furthermore,  these  results  may  point  to  a  major  limitation  of  the  cooperation  dependent 
variable themselves. As already lamented by Veugelers and Cassiman (2004), this data reveal 
only whether a firm cooperated or not, but there is no information in the survey about the 
intensity, efficiency and results of this interaction. It well might be that the finding that the 
cooperative projects are more demanding on internal capabilities of firms in more advanced 
countries points to the fact that these projects tend to be more significant, intensive, and 
possibly productive, as compared to those reported in the context of less advanced countries. 
Admittedly, the total COtotEXT dependent variable puts all kinds of cooperation projects into 
one basket, which might not be very helpful for disentangling nature of these effects. Even 
though we do not have detailed information about characteristics of the projects like those 
mentioned above, we actually know much more even from the existing data than what has 
been used so far. Could it be that these results obscure the difference between cooperation 
with domestic and foreign partners or with the various types of partners?  
 
Before turning the attention to the more detailed definitions of the dependent variables in the 
following sections, however, let us conclude this part of the paper by inspecting results of the 
random effects. After the GDPCAP variable has been included, standard deviation of the 
random effect for the intercept has slightly decreased, which confirms that a fraction of the 
unexplained variance across countries got accounted for by the overall level of development, 
but also that a lot remained unexplained by this single variable alone. Some of the cross-level 
interactions significantly improved the explanatory power of the model too; in particular the 
residuals of DOMGP and to a lesser extent of R&D have been reduced substantially. Overall, 
this suggests that we have explained some part of the un-modeled variability across countries 
by the GDPCAP variable, but a lot still remains to be unaccounted for. Nevertheless, we are 
not going to further extend the multilevel model at this point, but leave this exercise to the 
next section, where the other country-level variables taken into account in this paper make 
much more sense to be included into the model. 
 
Another diagnostic measure of multilevel models that has not been discussed yet is the so-
called index of dispersion. Although logit multilevel models do not have the level-1 error 
term, as already noted above, we can calculate a level-1 error variance scaling factor, the so-
called “index of dispersion”, which measures the extent to which the observed errors follow 
the theoretical binomial error distribution and therefore provides diagnostics of the non-linear 
specification (Luke 2004, pg. 57). Index of dispersion equal to 1 indicates perfect fit between 
the observed errors and the theoretical assumptions. A significant over- or under-dispersion 
indicates model misspecification, the presence of outliers or the exclusion of an important 
level in the model. Less than 5% dispersion is usually seen as satisfactory. The index of 
dispersion is equal or very close to unity, which confirms that from a technical point of view 
these estimates do not suffer from a major problem. 34 
 
5.2 Cooperation at home and abroad: How are they related?  
 
So far we have not  considered the difference between  domestic  and foreign cooperation, 
which  is  the  main  purpose  of  this  section.  COdomEXT  for  cooperation  with  a  domestic 
partner and COforEXT for cooperation with a foreign partner are the dependent variables. To 
examine in a more detail those firms that cooperate exclusively with domestic or foreign 
partners, we also use the COmnlEXT multinomial variable with four discrete outcomes that 
have been derived from the previous two variables. Since we have more than one possible 
outcome,  the  conventional  univariate  probit  model  is  not  satisfactory  for  this  purpose. 
COdomEXT and COforEXT require a bivariate probit model, while COmnlEXT needs to be 
investigated in a multinomial probit framework. Finally, in the last part of this section we also 
experiment  with  a  multilevel  multinomial  logit model  with  COmnlEXT as  the dependent 
variable. 
 
The  bivariate  probit  model  is  a  straightforward  extension  of  the  univariate  probit  model 
presented above for the purpose of estimating a model with two correlated binary outcomes 
jointly.  If  we  calibrated  two  separate  univariate  models  for  each  of  COdomEXT  and 
COforEXT, we would ignore the possibility that these decisions of firms might be correlated 
with each other. To allow for this overlap, we delineate a model with two equations relating 
both COdomEXT and COforEXT to the predictors as follows: 
 
(3)  P (COdomEXT=1  (1)) = 0(1) + 1(1)LARGE + 2(1)MEDIUM + 3(1)DOMGP + 
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P (COforEXT=1  (2)) = 0(2) + 1(2) LARGE + 2(2) MEDIUM + 3(2) DOMGP + 4(2) 
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where  ε(1)  and  ε(2)  are  residuals  sampled  from  the  bivariate  normal  distribution  that  are 
assumed to be correlated with each other. In other words, this implies that the covariance of 
[ε(1), ε(2)] equals a constant , rather than zero as is assumed in the univariate probit model, 
which indicates that the propensity of a firm to cooperate with domestic partners is allowed to 
be related to the propensity to cooperate abroad. As a consequence, a statistical test for  = 0 
can be estimated that examines the interdependence of the two types of cooperation. If the 
correlation  is  positive,  a  propensity  for  a  positive  outcome  on  the  former  simultaneously 
advances with the latter, perhaps because they are complementary. But the correlation may be 
negative  if  trade-offs  are  involved,  such  as  if  firms  tend  to  redirect  cooperation  from  a 
domestic partner to a foreign one or vice-a-versa. 
 
Apart of this relationship between the dependent variables, at the centre of our interest is the 
estimated effect of the FORGP dummy for foreign affiliates. As the explanatory variable of 
COdomEXT, this variable captures embeddedness of foreign affiliates in the host economy. 
Since the impact of foreign ownership on domestic cooperation is likely to be a mixture of 
positive and negative effects conditional on innovation strategy of the multinational company 
and attractiveness of the local milieu for cooperation, our expectation for  the sign of this 35 
 
coefficient is ambiguous. As argued above, however, foreign affiliates should have a superior 
access  to  (even  non-affiliated)  partners  for  cooperation  abroad  through  organizational 
proximity to their foreign parent and other firms in the group, so that we expect a strongly 
positive effect of FORGP on the COforEXT dependent variable. 
 
Similarly information that comes along with sales to the foreign market captured by the EXP 
dummy, in other words market proximity abroad, should at least partly help to overcome the 
disadvantages given by geographical distance of partners for COforEXT, and therefore the 
exporters are expected to be in a better position to engage in cooperation arrangements with 
foreign partners. Again, the link between EXP and COdomEXT is somewhat less transparent, 
because this relationship should be positive if the arguably more competitive environment in 
foreign markets urges firms to intensify cooperation with relevant partners in the local milieu, 
but the export orientation may also have the opposite effect if exporters are prone to choose 
foreign over domestic partners for cooperation. 
 
Table 11 presents results of the bivariate probit model based on the CIS4 sample in the left 
part and on the CIS3 sample in the right part of the table, respectively. Let us first compare 
the  estimated  effects  for  COdomEXT  and  COforEXT.  As  hypothesized  above,  the  main 
difference is in the coefficients of FORGP and EXP, which come out to be highly significant 
explanatory factors of both, but in terms of the magnitude their effect on domestic cooperation 
is marginal, while their effect on the propensity of firms to engage in cooperation with foreign 
partners is quite potent. Hence, the results strongly support the thesis that foreign affiliates 
capitalize on connections of their parent company and other firms in the group abroad. But the 
market proximity abroad comes out to be equally important to take into account in order to 
understand the difference. All of the other predictors have remarkably similar effects on both 
of the dependent variables.  
 
Some studies using samples of firms from innovation surveys in individual countries, such as 
the analysis of Belgian data by Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) and the Czech data by Knell 
and Srholec (2004), even found that foreign ownership tends to be negatively associated with 
domestic cooperation. However, our results do not support this finding. Although magnitude 
of the coefficient  is  very  small, we  side with  the result based on the  same CIS3 dataset 
reported  by  Srholec  (2009a)  that,  if  anything,  foreign  ownership  tends  to  be  positively 
associated with domestic cooperation.
24 As far as  the cooperation arrangements (with non-
affiliated) foreign partners are concerned, we are in agreement with  both Knell and Srholec 
(2004) and Srholec (2009a), who found strongly positive impact of foreign ownership in the 
Czech context and in the CIS3 micro-aggregated dataset from Eurostat, respectively; note that 
Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) did not test for this relationship.  
 
                                                 
24 It should be noted, however, that the aforementioned studies used a somewhat different framework and the 
effects of foreign ownership on domestic cooperation turned out to be sensitive to specification of the model, so 
that these results might not be entirely comparable. 36 
 
Table 11: Bivariate probit results for COdomEXT and COforEXT 
 
  CIS4  CIS3 
  COdomEXT  COforEXT  COdomEXT  COforEXT 
Constant  -1.176 (0.054)***  -1.899 (0.062)***  -1.862 (0.074)***  -2.324 (0.084)*** 
LARGE  0.360 (0.025)***  0.442 (0.029)***  0.532 (0.038)***  0.577 (0.042)*** 
MEDIUM  0.066 (0.020)***  0.111 (0.024)***  0.251 (0.030)***  0.264 (0.035)*** 
DOMGP  0.209 (0.022)***  0.295 (0.026)***  0.313 (0.033)***  0.336 (0.037)*** 
FORGP  0.081 (0.026)***  0.346 (0.028)***  0.108 (0.038)***  0.370 (0.041)*** 
EXP  0.085 (0.020)***  0.407 (0.025)***  0.068 (0.029)**  0.391 (0.032)*** 
R&D  0.534 (0.020)***  0.532 (0.025)***  0.456 (0.027)***  0.354 (0.032)*** 
INFO  0.207 (0.020)***  0.275 (0.023)***  0.199 (0.028)***  0.222 (0.031)*** 
PROT  0.290 (0.018)***  0.325 (0.021)***  0.231 (0.026)***  0.294 (0.029)*** 
OBS  0.117 (0.017)***  0.095 (0.020)***  0.176 (0.025)***  0.187 (0.029)*** 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  0.782 (0.007)***  0.776 (0.009)*** 
Wald 
2  6,071.25***  2,705.95*** 
N  28,623  13,827 
 






Finally, the residuals are highly positively correlated, which strongly supports the notion of 
interdependence between the decisions of firms to cooperate at home and abroad. Strictly 
speaking,  this  may  not  necessarily  be  due  to  complementary  nature  of  these  cooperation 
strategies, but due to omitted factors affecting both types of cooperation, though we side with 
the former interpretation, because so many relevant factors have been accounted for in the 
model, and the relationship appears quite strong. Firms do not choose between a domestic or 
foreign partner, they most often combine both. Arguably, this is a relevant policy finding, 
because  this  result  shows  that  fears  of  hollowing  out  of  the  local  innovation  systems  by 
increasingly  globalized interactions  of firms  in  the innovation process  do not  seem  to  be 
justified by the results.  
 
Even though COdomEXT and COforEXT appear to be compatible in many ways, there are 
firms with exclusively domestic or foreign partners, which might be obscured by the general 
correlation between them, but which are interesting for us in their own right, exactly because 
they deviate from the typical behaviour. To understand better these cases, we estimate the 
multinomial probit model with four discrete categories of the COmnlEXT variable, as already 
defined above, given by 0 for firms that did not cooperate, 1 for those that cooperated with a 
domestic external partner only, 2 for those that cooperated with a foreign partner only, and 3 
for firms with both domestic and foreign partners simultaneously. Naturally, the first outcome 
is the base category, so that the estimated regression equation is delineated as follows: 
 
 
(4)  P [COmnlEXT=1 / COmnlEXT=0)  (1)] = 0(1) + 1(1)LARGE + 2(1)MEDIUM + 
3(1)DOMGP + 4(1)FORGP + 5(1)EXP + 6(1)R&D + 7(1)INFO + 8(1)PROT 








) 1 ( n 11 NAT + ε(1) 
P [COmnlEXT=2 / COmnlEXT=0)  (2)] = 0(2) + 1(2) LARGE + 2(2) MEDIUM + 
3(2) DOMGP + 4(2) FORGP + 5(2) EXP + 6(2) R&D + 7(2) INFO + 8(2) PROT 








) 2 ( n 11 NAT + ε(2) 
P [COmnlEXT=3 / COmnlEXT=0)  (3)] = 0(3) + 1(3) LARGE + 2(3) MEDIUM + 
3(3) DOMGP + 4(3) FORGP + 5(3) EXP + 6(3) R&D + 7(3) INFO + 8(3) PROT 








) 3 ( n 11 NAT + ε(3) 
 
where P (COmnlEXT=0) = 1 – P (COmnlEXT=1) – P (COmnlEXT=2) – P (COmnlEXT=3) 
and the error terms ε(1), ε(2) and ε(3) are assumed to be independent, standard normal, random 
variables.  
 
Table 12 gives results of the multinomial probit estimates based on the CIS4 dataset on the 
left hand side and the CIS3 dataset on the right hand side, respectively. Firms that cooperate 
both at home and abroad (COmnlEXT=3) constitute the most promising situation from the 
knowledge  transfer  viewpoint,  because  these  firms  channel  knowledge  through  these 
arrangements within the local environment and at the same time across national borders, thus 
opening gates for potential knowledge spillovers in both directions. A brief look at the results 
reveals that these are predominantly large firms, affiliated to a network of other enterprises in 38 
 
Table 12: Multinomial probit results for COmnlEXT 
 
  CIS4  CIS3 
  COmnlEXT=1  COmnlEXT=2  COmnlEXT=3  COmnlEXT=1  COmnlEXT=2  COmnlEXT=3 
Constant  -1.740 (0.087)***  -2.929 (0.126)***  -2.839 (0.095)***  -2.681 (0.121)***  -3.587 (0.174)***  -3.512 (0.124)*** 
LARGE  0.293 (0.040)***  0.380 (0.065)***  0.723 (0.042)***  0.490 (0.061)***  0.448 (0.092)***  0.974 (0.062)*** 
MEDIUM  0.071 (0.031)**  0.161 (0.052)***  0.166 (0.036)***  0.272 (0.047)***  0.250 (0.072)***  0.438 (0.051)*** 
DOMGP  0.227 (0.034)***  0.432 (0.057)***  0.448 (0.038)***  0.349 (0.052)***  0.410 (0.085)***  0.543 (0.055)*** 
FORGP  -0.024 (0.042)  0.577 (0.059)***  0.366 (0.042)***  0.013 (0.062)  0.623 (0.085)***  0.400 (0.061)*** 
EXP  -0.098 (0.031)***  0.395 (0.055)***  0.533 (0.037)***  -0.087 (0.047)*  0.621 (0.065)***  0.402 (0.047)*** 
R&D  0.612 (0.031)***  0.494 (0.053)***  0.941 (0.037)***  0.559 (0.043)***  0.286 (0.063)***  0.684 (0.047)*** 
INFO  0.123 (0.032)***  0.184 (0.053)***  0.454 (0.034)***  0.109 (0.045)**  0.031 (0.069)  0.394 (0.045)*** 
PROT  0.288 (0.029)***  0.295 (0.047)***  0.548 (0.031)***  0.177 (0.041)***  0.249 (0.063)***  0.474 (0.042)*** 
OBS  0.141 (0.030)***  0.093 (0.044)**  0.164 (0.030)***  0.189 (0.040)***  0.202 (0.062)***  0.312 (0.042)*** 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald 
2  5,738.86***  2,658.98*** 
N  28,623  13,827 
 






a group and with  extensive innovation  capabilities, because the predictors  came out  with 
highly significant and large coefficients without exception. The main purpose of this model, 
however,  is  to  highlight  the  two  middle  categories  of  firms  with  exclusively  domestic 
(COmnlEXT=1) or exclusively foreign (COmnlEXT=2) partners. Again, as can be expected, 
factors influencing these two outcomes do not differ that much, with the prime exception of 
the FORGP and EXP predictors.  
 
Being affiliated to a foreign group of firms does not seem to make a significant difference for 
the propensity to engage exclusively with a domestic partner, which strengthens the previous 
conclusion that in this sense the innovation strategies of foreign affiliates per se do not tend to  
alter linkages in the local milieu, at least this is not the prevailing pattern in the data, but on 
the other hand the organization proximity abroad makes a great deal of difference for the 
likelihood of exclusively foreign cooperation, for which this effect has the highest magnitude 
as compared to the other predictors, even higher than the size or R&D capabilities of firms. In 
other words, foreign ownership does not constrain domestic cooperation, but provides distinct 
opportunities for international transfer of technology through foreign cooperation, possibly in 
situations when relevant partners are simply not available in the local environment. Similarly 
exporting comes out with a very large and highly significant coefficient for having a foreign 
partner only, so that market proximity rules in this context too, but in contrast simultaneously 
depresses the odds of having a domestic partner only, even though this effect is very small, 
and therefore does not merit much attention.   
 
Again, these results underline that cooperation with partners abroad is  strongly related to 
organizational and market proximity to foreign locations. But these general trends might mask 
significant differences across countries. Could it be that indeed under certain circumstances 
foreign ownership constrains domestic cooperation of firms, or does not really facilitate the 
foreign one? Could it be that the R&D capability of firms matters for their attractiveness as 
partners for domestic cooperation only from a certain threshold of economic development, 
and that this threshold is substantially different for foreign cooperation? Could it be that the 
large  differences  between  countries  in  the  aggregate  propensity  to  foreign  cooperation 
detected  in  the  descriptive  statistics  above  can  not  be  really  attributed  to  the  national 
framework  conditions  per  se,  but  are  primarily  driven  by  characteristics  of  the  firms 
themselves? Should on the other hand distinctly national factors, such as for instance size of 
the country, be taken much more seriously into account for comparing this data, because firms 
operating in smaller countries naturally tend to interact more across national borders? 
 
As already discussed above, multilevel modelling is the best framework for examining this 
kind of contextual hypotheses. Hence, we estimate a multilevel version of the multinomial 
logit model, which explains the four discrete outcomes given by location of the partner by 
factors operating at the firm and country levels.
25 COmnlEXT is the dependent variable, the 
vector of firm-level dummies for LARGE, MEDIUM, DOMGP, FORGP, EXP, R&D, INFO, 
PROT, OBS are the level-1 predictors, while the vector of country-level indicators GDPCAP, 
POP and GLOBAL  are the level-2 predictors.  For the same reason a s in the previous 
multilevel estimate, the set of industry dummies IND is included, but  their effects are  not 
allowed to differ across countries. A full specification of this model is the following: 
 
                                                 
25  Unfortunately,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  multivariate  multilevel  probit  (or  logit)  models  cannot  be 
computed in the general statistical software packages like Stata, SPSS or SAS, and not even in those specialized 
in multilevel modelling such as HLM or  MLwiN, so that we could not estimate the bivariate model above (or 
the multivariate models presented below) in the multilevel framework. 40 
 
(5) Level-1 model: 
 
P (COmnlEXTij=k  j(k)) = P(k) 
Log P(k)/P(0) = 0j(k) + 1j(k)  LARGEij + 2j(k)  MEDIUMij + 3j(k)  DOMGPij + 4j(k)  FORGPij 




) k ( m 10 INDi 
 
Level-2 model: 
0j(k) = 00(k) + 01(k) GDPCAPj + 02(k) POPj + 03(k) GLOBALj + u0j(k) 
1j(k) = 10(k) + 11(k) GDPCAPj + 12(k) POPj + 13(k) GLOBALj + u1j(k) 
2j(k) = 20(k) + 21(k) GDPCAPj + 22(k) POPj + 23(k) GLOBALj + u2j(k) 
3j(k) = 30(k) + 31(k) GDPCAPj + 32(k) POPj + 33(k) GLOBALj + u3j(k) 
4j(k) = 40(k) + 41(k) GDPCAPj + 42(k) POPj + 43(k) GLOBALj + u4j(k) 
5j(k) = 50(k) + 51(k) GDPCAPj + 52(k) POPj + 53(k) GLOBALj + u5j(k) 
6j(k) = 60(k) + 61(k) GDPCAPj + 62(k) POPj + 63(k) GLOBALj + u6j(k) 
7j(k) = 70(k) + 71(k) GDPCAPj + 72(k) POPj + 73(k) GLOBALj + u7j(k) 
8j(k) = 80(k) + 81(k) GDPCAPj + 82(k) POPj + 83(k) GLOBALj + u8j(k) 
9j(k) = 90(k) + 91(k) GDPCAPj + 92(k) POPj + 93(k) GLOBALj + u9j(k) 
 
where i denotes a firm, j is a country and k is the positive discrete outcome (k = 1, 2 or 3). 
COmnlEXT=0  is  the  base  category,  so  that  by  logic  of  the  multinomial  model 
P (COmnlEXT=0) = 1 – P (COmnlEXT=k). From this follows that there are three sets of 
fixed effects 00(k) … 93(k) and three sets of random effects u0j(k) … u9j(k), of which 00(k) are the 
estimated grand means of the log-odds of the respective outcome across countries, 01(k), 02(k) 
and 03(k) are the country effects on these intercepts, u0j(k) indicate that the countries vary 
around that intercepts, 10(k) ... 90(k) are the estimated means of the firm-level slopes across 
countries, 11(k) … 93(k) are the cross-level interactions between the firm- and country-level 
predictors and u1j(k) ... u9j(k)  indicate that the firm-level slopes vary not only as a function of 
the predictors but also as a function of unobserved country effects; all of the random effects 






Table 13 provides the results. To improve interpretability of the  estimated effects, as in the 
previous multilevel estimate,  we standardized  the level-2  predictors  GDPCAP, POP and 
GLOBAL  by deducting mean and dividing by standard deviation , so that these variables 
appear in the estimate with mean of zero and standard deviation equal  to one too, and all of 
the predictors have a meaningful zero-point. Since the level-2 predictors are in the same units 
of  standard  deviation   after  this  transformation ,  furthermore,  we  can  directly  compare 
magnitude of their coefficients. Again, we estimate this multilevel model only on the CIS4 
sample,  because the CIS3 dataset do es not include enough  information  to find a reliable 
solution for this relatively complicated problem.   
 
Let us first consider the intercept effects, which are reported in the top of the table. Several 
statically significant effects of the country variables on the intercept, hence explaining central 
tendencies in the data regardless of characteristics of the firms, have been detected for the last 
two outcomes of  exclusively foreign  cooperation and simultaneously domestic and foreign 
cooperation, though none of them came out significant in the first equation on e xclusively 
domestic partners.  National framework conditions represented by the GDPCAP, POP and 
                                                 
26 Note that there are no terms for the level-1 residuals, because for a multinomial outcome the variance is 
completely determined by the population means, so that these residuals are not separate terms to be estimated. 41 
 
GLOBAL variables are therefore much more relevant for explaining the propensity of firms 
to arrangements on cooperation involving a foreign partner, than those that do not.   
 
GDPCAP comes out with a negatively significant effect on the propensity of the last outcome, 
which suggests that firms located in less advanced countries, such as the new EU member 
countries, are more likely to combine cooperation with both domestic and foreign partners. 
Arguably,  this  confirms  the  previous  finding  based  on  the  overall  cooperation  variable 
presented above, because one reason for firms to undergo the trouble of cooperating with both 
could be that there are not enough relevant partners at home. In other words, a relative lack 
(or  a  low  quality)  of  domestic  partners  provokes  firms  operating  in  the  less  advanced 
environment to search for partners abroad. To the extent that the GDPCAP variable can be 
understood as a broad proxy for quality of the national innovation system, this result suggests 
that  more  frequent  cooperation  of  firms  abroad  can  actually  signal  a  backward  national 
innovation system, which is the exact opposite of how the cooperation variables tend to be 
interpreted in the existing literature on this topic.  
 
Size of the country, given by the POP variable, is significantly negatively associated to both 
of the outcomes involving foreign cooperation, which confirms the expectation that firms 
located in smaller countries are for natural reasons, equivalent to those for higher intensity on 
trading abroad, relatively more likely to engage with a foreign partner. Essentially, this further 
illuminates the tendency of firms in the new EU member countries to frequently engage in 
foreign cooperation, because  most of  these  countries  are quite  small.  In other words, for 
example,  this  helps  us  to  understand  why  in  the  descriptive  overview  presented  above 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania appeared with much higher frequency of cooperation abroad 
than Germany, Italy or Romania; leaving other relevant factors aside for the moment. Even 
though  this  is  not  a  very  relevant  policy  finding,  because  there  is  not  much  that  the 
government can do about size of the country, this result highlights a major methodological 
point. Since this national variable clearly matters, the cooperation data should be presented 
orthogonal to size of the country, if anybody considers deriving relevant policy implications 
from differences between countries.  
 
GLOBAL that stands for globalization of the economy comes out significantly positively 
associated to the last two outcomes involving foreign cooperation, which is also well in line 
with expectations, because firms operating in generally more globalized environment, given 
either by policy, geography, history or for whatever reason, should be relatively more outward 
looking in search for their cooperation partners. Furthermore, it should be noticed, that the 
effect of this variable on the exclusively domestic cooperation is positive too, although not 
statistically  significant  at  conventional  levels,  so  that  globalization  does  not  certainly 
undermine the appetite  of firms  for cooperation at  home  either.  A straightforward policy 
implication from this finding is that fears of destabilizing the domestic innovation system by 
deepening globalization of the economy do not seem to be supported by evidence provided by 
this cooperation data. 
 
Statistically significant cross-level interaction effects have been detected mostly in the last 
equations  for  firms  cooperating  both  at  home  and  abroad,  but  rarely  for  the  other  two 
outcomes. Being affiliated to a domestic group of enterprises, given by the DOMGP dummy, 
facilitates  access  to  external  knowledge  through  cooperation  arrangements  on  innovation 
relatively more in less advanced and less globalized countries, which indicates that domestic 
business groups play a central role in national innovation systems like these. Nevertheless, 
foreign ownership, represented by the FORGP dummy, does not significantly interact with the 42 
 
country variables, which is contradictory to the hypothesis that strategies of foreign affiliates 
are context specific, even though it should be noticed that the random effects reported at the 
bottom  of  the  table  come  out  relatively  high  for  this  variable,  so  that  indeed  there  are 
differences across countries in this effect, although these are not related to the three national 
variables taken into account here. 
 
Furthermore,  the  results  confirm  that  the  effect  of  R&D  capabilities  of  firms  strongly 
increases with the development level of the country, at least for the last outcome, which can 
be interpreted either as the fact that cooperation is more intensive on internal R&D of firms in 
more developed environment, but also that firms without R&D capabilities cooperate more 
often in less advanced countries. As already discussed above, the latter interpretation actually 
suggests that firms in less advanced countries tend to cooperate with other organizations to 
make up for their limited internal capabilities. For example, a firm might engage in a joint 
project with a publicly funded laboratory, because the firm does not have enough resources 
(or just do not want to spend them) to maintain R&D facilities on its own. From a policy 
perspective, this might look as a favourable situation, if taken out of the context, because the 
public research infrastructure becomes unutilized for the purpose of innovation, but one needs 
to be very careful to interpret this as a generally positive outcome, because this might actually 
reflect deficient capabilities of firms. Again, this shows that more cooperation on innovation 
does not necessarily indicate a positive trend, which is essential to keep in mind for properly 
interpreting this data.  
 
Size of the firm, represented by the LARGE and MEDIUM dummies, interacts positively 
with the GDPCAP national factor in the third equation, which suggests that ceteris paribus 
larger firms have higher likelihood to cooperate in more advanced countries, which could pick 
up the fact that in this context the cooperation projects are probably more extensive than in 
less advanced countries. Also MEDIUM interacts positively with GLOBAL, which indicates 
scale advantages  in  the ability of firms  to  benefit  from  globalization of the economy for 
cooperation. Only a single cross-level interaction came out at least modestly significant in the 
equations on exclusively domestic or foreign cooperation, which is the joint effect of EXP 
and POP in the first one. Since the sign is positive, this interaction suggests that the generally 
negative association between exporting and exclusively domestic cooperation is relatively less 
pronounced in countries with larger population, which is a sensible effect, because larges 
countries offer more domestic partners. None of the other possible cross-level interactions 
does look to be very relevant. 
 
So much for what we have been able to explain, but equally insightful in the context of 
multilevel modeling is the residual variance. Many of the random effects  come out quite 
strong, which indicates that a noticeable part of the diversity across countries remains not 
accounted for. As already mentioned above, however, the number of countries in the sample 
is quite small, so that we have to constrain the model to a relatively small set of national 
predictors. At the same time, other relevant indicators of the national framework conditions 
that one may rightly point out to be potentially relevant, such as those directly measuring 
quality of the national research infrastructure, could not have been added in the estimates, 
because these variables tend to be excessively correlated to the incumbent ones. Finally, the 
unexplained differences could be driven by idiosyncratic national factors, because countries 
are different from each other in many qualitative respects. Although we have been able to 
identify quite strong regularities, there is arguably a limit to how much we can explain by 
quantitative methods like these. To illuminate the rest is a task for more detailed qualitative 
research. 43 
 
Table 13: Multilevel multinomial logit results for COmnlEXT (CIS4) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  COmnlEXT = 1  COmnlEXT = 2  COmnlEXT = 3 
       
Fixed Effects:       
For Interceptij (0j)       
Interceptij (00)  -2.158 (0.184)***  -4.856 (0.246)***  -4.337 (0.225)*** 
GDPCAPj (01)  -0.070 (0.206)  -0.175 (0.220)  -0.562 (0.247)** 
POPj (02)  -0.351 (0.214)  -0.558 (0.254)**  -0.729 (0.262)** 
GLOBALj (03)  0.176 (0.200)  0.466 (0.239)*  0.616 (0.244)** 
For LARGEij slope (1j)       
LARGEij (10)  0.337 (0.119)**  0.544 (0.170)***  0.921 (0.080)*** 
GDPCAPj (11)  0.276 (0.145)*  -0.010 (0.193)  0.314 (0.092)*** 
POPj (12)  -0.008 (0.142)  -0.110 (0.209)  -0.051 (0.095) 
GLOBALj (13)  0.146 (0.132)  0.316 (0.194)  0.107 (0.090) 
For MEDIUMij slope (2j)       
MEDIUMij (20)  0.088 (0.071)  0.298 (0.125)**  0.226 (0.068)*** 
GDPCAPj (21)  0.083 (0.085)  -0.060 (0.135)  0.180 (0.076)** 
POPj (22)  0.025 (0.082)  -0.133 (0.148)  -0.122 (0.080) 
GLOBALj (23)  0.173 (0.080)*  0.237 (0.150)  0.202 (0.079)** 
For DOMGPij slope (3j)       
DOMGPij (30)  0.481 (0.085)***  0.640 (0.130)***  0.636 (0.083)*** 
GDPCAPj (31)  -0.160 (0.099)  -0.148 (0.143)  -0.325 (0.096)*** 
POPj (32)  -0.127 (0.092)  0.174 (0.144)  0.156 (0.095) 
GLOBALj (33)  0.014 (0.088)  -0.167 (0.151)  -0.250 (0.094)** 
For FORGPij slope (4j)     
FORGPij (40)  -0.191 (0.119)  0.919 (0.152)***  0.443 (0.079)*** 
GDPCAPj (41)  -0.067 (0.148)  0.020 (0.170)  -0.124 (0.092) 
POPj (42)  0.083 (0.145)  0.181 (0.185)  0.067 (0.096) 
GLOBALj (43)  -0.087 (0.134)  -0.050 (0.178)  0.000 (0.092) 
For EXPij slope (5j)     
EXPij (50)  -0.332 (0.083)***  0.713 (0.130)***  0.735 (0.080)*** 
GDPCAPj (51)  0.038 (0.096)  0.139 (0.127)  0.009 (0.088) 
POPj (52)  0.230 (0.097)**  -0.219 (0.157)  0.034 (0.095) 
GLOBALj (53)  -0.051 (0.093)  -0.126 (0.148)  -0.150 (0.092) 
For R&Dij slope (6j)     
R&Dij (60)  0.620 (0.111)***  0.593 (0.130)***  1.343 (0.092)*** 
GDPCAPj (61)  0.109 (0.137)  0.166 (0.147)  0.420 (0.111)*** 
POPj (62)  0.162 (0.137)  -0.102 (0.159)  -0.053 (0.119) 
GLOBALj (63)  -0.026 (0.127)  -0.047 (0.147)  -0.200 (0.105)* 
For INFOij slope (7j)     
INFOij (70)  0.140 (0.100)  0.178 (0.138)  0.614 (0.111)*** 
GDPCAPj (71)  0.105 (0.120)  -0.292 (0.152)*  0.070 (0.131) 
POPj (72)  -0.063 (0.122)  0.097 (0.172)  -0.043 (0.136) 
GLOBALj (73)  -0.069 (0.114)  -0.017 (0.167)  -0.145 (0.130) 
For PROTij slope (8j)     
PROTij (80)  0.271 (0.092)**  0.438 (0.127)***  0.667 (0.078)*** 
GDPCAPj (81)  -0.071 (0.109)  -0.012 (0.143)  0.133 (0.090) 
POPj (82)  0.177 (0.110)  0.165 (0.153)  0.192 (0.094)* 
GLOBALj (83)  -0.021 (0.105)  -0.251 (0.150)  -0.004 (0.091) 
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Continued from the previous page     
     
For OBSij slope (9j)     
OBSij (90)  0.175 (0.070)**  0.026 (0.112)  0.209 (0.062)*** 
GDPCAPj (91)  0.055 (0.083)  -0.130 (0.125)  0.112 (0.071) 
POPj (92)  -0.012 (0.084)  0.235 (0.137)  -0.065 (0.074) 
GLOBALj (93)  -0.036 (0.079)  -0.054 (0.134)  -0.065 (0.073) 
       
Industry dummies (10m)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
Random effects:       
Interceptij (u0j)  0.624  0.573  0.748 
LARGEij slope (u1j)  0.348  0.418  0.168 
MEDIUMij slope (u2j)  0.172  0.276  0.158 
DOMGPij slope (u3j)  0.207  0.190  0.217 
FORGPij slope (u4j)  0.353  0.374  0.178 
EXPij slope (u5j)  0.241  0.215  0.214 
R&Dij slope (u6j)  0.367  0.274  0.242 
INFOij slope (u7j)  0.310  0.342  0.378 
PROTij slope (u8j)  0.282  0.332  0.232 
OBSij slope (u9j)  0.196  0.267  0.160 
Level-1 observations  28,623 
Level-2 groups  15 
 
Note: Non-linear unit-specific model with the logit link function; restricted maximum likelihood (PQL) estimate; 
coefficients and standard errors in brackets reported for the fixed effects; standard deviations reported for the 
random effects; *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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5.3 Cooperation arrangements with different types of partners: Are they 
compatible? 
 
To further deepen the analysis, we explore the heterogeneity of cooperation by the type of 
partners. Unlike in the previous section, where we estimated the bivariate probit model for 
two  correlated  binary  outcomes,  we  examine  a  situation  with  more  than  two  correlated 
outcomes, which requires the multivariate probit model. COtotSUP, COtotCUS, COtotCOM, 
COtotINS, COtotUNI and COtotGMT dummies for cooperation with each of the six types of 
external partners are the dependent variables.    
 
If we estimated separate univariate models for each of the six dummies, we would ignore the 
possibility that the decisions of firms to cooperate with the different types of partners might 
be related to  each other. To allow for their  correlation,  we predict probability of the  six 
outcomes jointly in the multivariate framework as follows:  
 
(6)  P (CO(k) =1  (k)) = 0(k) + 1(k)LARGE + 2(k)MEDIUM + 3(k)DOMGP + 









) k ( n 11 NAT + ε(k) 
 
where k refers to the six types of partners (k = 1 ... 6 = COtotSUP, COtotCUS, COtotCOM, 
COtotINS, COtotUNI and COtotGMT), hence ε(k) denotes six residuals (ε(1) ... ε(6)) sampled 
from the multivariate normal distribution that are assumed to be correlated with each other, so 
that  there  is  covariance  matrix  V  with  values  of  1  on  the  leading  diagonal  and  these 
correlations ρxk = ρkx as off-diagonal elements. Similarly to the bivariate probit model, we can 
therefore test a hypothesis that their correlation is equal to zero (xk = ρkx = 0), which allows 
us  to  examine  the  interdependence  between  the  different  types  of  cooperation.  If  the 
correlation is positive, the propensity for a positive outcome on one type of the partner tends 
to  increase simultaneously with  the other.  If the  correlation turns out  to  be negative, the 
opposite tendency has been detected.  
 
Tables 14.1 and 14.2 provide results of the multivariate probit estimates based on the CIS4 
and CIS3 samples, respectively.
27 Most of the predictors, with only a few exceptions that tend 
to prove the rule, are highly statistically significant across the board. To the extent that there 
are noticeable differences in magnitude of the estimated coefficients, these mainly follow the 
divide  between  other  firms  (suppliers,  customers  or  competitors)  versus  research 
organizations (consultants, research institutes and universities) as the partners for cooperation. 
For example, the latter seem to be slightly more demanding on resources, capabilities and 
perceptions of firms with regards the innovation process (R&D, INFO, PROT and OBS), but 
the differences are relatively small.  
 
                                                 
27 Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) provide extension of the bivariate probit model for more than two dependent 
variables, which has been used to estimate the multivariate probit model in Stata 9.2. 46 
 
 
Table 14.1: Multivariate probit by the type of partner (CIS4) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  COtotSUP  COtotCUS  COtotCOM  COtotINS  COtotUNI  COtotGMT 
Constant  -1.236 (0.055)***  -1.713 (0.059)***  -1.930 (0.069)***  -1.772 (0.065)***  -2.096 (0.065)***  -1.891 (0.068)*** 
LARGE  0.363 (0.026)***  0.193 (0.028)***  0.278 (0.031)***  0.348 (0.030)***  0.446 (0.029)***  0.355 (0.035)*** 
MEDIUM  0.105 (0.021)***  -0.013 (0.023)  -0.003 (0.026)  0.067 (0.024)***  0.128 (0.025)***  0.057 (0.030)* 
DOMGP  0.237 (0.023)***  0.223 (0.024)***  0.150 (0.027)***  0.239 (0.026)***  0.247 (0.026)***  0.202 (0.030)*** 
FORGP  0.206 (0.027)***  0.225 (0.029)***  0.085 (0.031)***  0.172 (0.030)***  0.161 (0.030)***  0.132 (0.036)*** 
EXP  0.071 (0.021)***  0.176 (0.023)***  0.032 (0.026)  0.113 (0.025)***  0.167 (0.026)***  0.136 (0.030)*** 
R&D  0.405 (0.022)***  0.516 (0.024)***  0.436 (0.026)***  0.508 (0.026)***  0.673 (0.027)***  0.559 (0.033)*** 
INFO  0.184 (0.021)***  0.206 (0.023)***  0.234 (0.024)***  0.227 (0.024)***  0.241 (0.024)***  0.216 (0.028)*** 
PROT  0.260 (0.019)***  0.260 (0.021)***  0.216 (0.023)***  0.264 (0.022)***  0.334 (0.022)***  0.343 (0.025)*** 
OBS  0.096 (0.018)***  0.132 (0.020)***  0.128 (0.021)***  0.109 (0.021)***  0.132 (0.021)***  0.107 (0.025)*** 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2k  0.754 (0.007)***           
3k  0.659 (0.009)***  0.715 (0.008)***         
4k  0.668 (0.009)***  0.658 (0.008)***  0.643 (0.009)***       
5k  0.596 (0.010)***  0.639 (0.009)***  0.607 (0.010)***  0.683 (0.009)***     
6k  0.583 (0.012)***  0.637 (0.011)***  0.612 (0.011)***  0.682 (0.010)***  0.778 (0.008)***   
Wald 
2  7,502.36*** 
N  28,623 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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Table 14.2: Multivariate probit by the type of partner (CIS3) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  COtotSUP  COtotCUS  COtotCOM  COtotINS  COtotUNI  COtotGMT 
Constant  -1.962 (0.078)***  -2.199 (0.083)***  -2.500 (0.100)***  -2.178 (0.086)***  -2.393 (0.091)***  -2.737 (0.099)*** 
LARGE  0.465 (0.040)***  0.368 (0.041)***  0.350 (0.045)***  0.523 (0.042)***  0.592 (0.044)***  0.632 (0.047)*** 
MEDIUM  0.245 (0.032)***  0.168 (0.033)***  0.217 (0.037)***  0.241 (0.035)***  0.255 (0.037)***  0.341 (0.039)*** 
DOMGP  0.312 (0.035)***  0.305 (0.036)***  0.272 (0.041)***  0.320 (0.037)***  0.307 (0.038)***  0.278 (0.040)*** 
FORGP  0.281 (0.040)***  0.209 (0.041)***  0.197 (0.045)***  0.250 (0.042)***  0.134 (0.045)***  0.053 (0.047) 
EXP  0.138 (0.030)***  0.180 (0.032)***  0.075 (0.035)**  0.089 (0.032)***  0.221 (0.033)***  0.160 (0.036)*** 
R&D  0.308 (0.029)***  0.383 (0.031)***  0.403 (0.036)***  0.409 (0.032)***  0.575 (0.036)***  0.536 (0.039)*** 
INFO  0.185 (0.030)***  0.156 (0.031)***  0.186 (0.033)***  0.222 (0.031)***  0.224 (0.032)***  0.197 (0.034)*** 
PROT  0.215 (0.028)***  0.186 (0.028)***  0.152 (0.032)***  0.256 (0.029)***  0.223 (0.030)***  0.198 (0.032)*** 
OBS  0.119 (0.028)***  0.181 (0.028)***  0.139 (0.031)***  0.168 (0.029)***  0.191 (0.030)***  0.193 (0.032)*** 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2k  0.763 (0.009)***           
3k  0.723 (0.011)***  0.774 (0.010)***         
4k  0.736 (0.010)***  0.718 (0.010)***  0.725 (0.011)***       
5k  0.678 (0.012)***  0.687 (0.011)***  0.676 (0.012)***  0.728 (0.011)***     
6k  0.649 (0.013)***  0.659 (0.013)***  0.659 (0.014)***  0.707 (0.012)***  0.783 (0.010)***   
Wald 
2  3,429.88*** 
N  13,827 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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The main result of this exercise can be found in the lower part of the table, where correlations 
between the residuals are reported. All of them are strongly positive and highly statistically 
significant, which indicates that the dependent variables are closely linked to each other. As 
already discussed above, these correlations might be positive due to complementary nature of 
the different types of cooperation but also due to omitted predictors jointly affecting them, but 
we side with the former, because many relevant predictors have been accounted for and their 
relations  come  out  to  be  very  strong.  Even  after  controlling  for  a  battery  of  relevant 
explanatory variables in the multivariate framework, we confirm the finding derived from the 
exploratory factor analysis above that there seems to be a strong tendency of firms to be 
generally cooperative or not, regardless of the type of partners.  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
Using large micro datasets from the Third and Fourth Community Innovation Surveys in 
sixteen European countries, we examined the propensity of firms to cooperate on innovation 
with domestic as compared to foreign partners, with different types of organizations and how 
these patterns differ across countries. Econometric estimates of univariate, multivariate and 
multinomial probit (or logit) models, including their multilevel variants, revealed significant 
heterogeneity of the effects of organization and market proximity and substantial differences 
in some of these relationships between countries. More specifically, the main results can be 
summarized as follows. 
 
Strong complementarities have been detected between cooperation of firms on innovation 
with domestic and foreign partners. Firms do not choose between cooperating at home or 
abroad, they most often combine both, so that fears of hollowing out of the local innovation 
milieu  by  increasingly  globalized  interactions  of  firms  in  the  innovation  process  are  not 
justified by the results. Also the decisions of firms to cooperate with the various types of 
cooperation partners is closely correlated to each other, because most firms simultaneously 
combine knowledge from multiple external sources. 
 
Scale  advantages,  innovation  capabilities  and  affiliation  to  a  domestic  group  boost 
cooperation of firms in the innovation process, regardless of whether the partner organization 
is located at home or abroad. Organizational proximity abroad, given by affiliation to a group 
with headquarters abroad, facilitates international knowledge transfer through cooperation on 
innovation with external foreign partners, but does not seem to undermine linkages of foreign 
affiliates  in  the  host  country.  Similarly  market  proximity  to  foreign  customers  promotes 
access  to  partners  for  cooperation  abroad,  but  does  not  make  much  difference  for  the 
propensity of firms to cooperate at home. Global activities of firms do not constrain their local 
relations.  
 
Significant differences have been found between countries at different levels of development, 
particularly  in  the  propensity  to  foreign  cooperation.  Surprisingly,  firms  located  in  less 
advanced  countries  appear  more  cooperative  on  innovation,  even  after  controlling  for  a 
variety of other relevant effects in the multilevel econometric framework. Size of the country 
is for natural reasons, equivalent to those for lower propensity to foreign trade, negatively 
associated  to  the  frequency  of  foreign  cooperation,  hence  this  data  should  be  interpreted 
orthogonal  to  size  of  the  country,  if  anybody  considers  deriving  relevant  policy 
recommendations. Globalization of the national economic system,  given by trade, foreign 49 
 
direct  investment  and  foreign  licensing,  makes  firms  relatively  more  outward  looking  in 
cooperation on innovation, but does not weaken their local links, which further supports the 
conclusion that globalization does not destabilize the local systemic interactions. Moreover, 
there  is  a  substantial  variability  of  the  micro  effects  across  countries,  which  highlights 
sensitivity of the firms to national framework conditions. Organizational proximity to other 
firms  tends  to  be  much  more  intimately  related  to  cooperation  on  innovation  in  those 
operating in less advanced countries, whereas the effects of internal capabilities of firms, 
especially R&D, broadly follow the opposite tendency. 
 
But  the  results  also  reveal  that  the  context  matters  for  interpretation  of  the  cooperation 
variables themselves, because these arrangements in less advanced countries may actually 
more than anything else indicate limited internal capabilities of firms and a lack of relevant 
local partners for domestic cooperation, so that evidence on cooperation behaviour of firms 
should be used in comparative studies, such as the European Innovation Scoreboard, with a 
great caution. Finally, there are significant unexplained random differences across countries, 
which could be driven by idiosyncratic national factors, because countries are different from 
each other in many qualitative respects. Although we have been able to identify relatively 
strong national regularities, there is obviously a limit to how much we can ever explain by 
quantitative methods like these. 
 
From  the  methodological  perspective,  however,  the  paper  shows  how  cross-country 
comparative research can be conducted by using data directly at the firm-level. Analysis of 
the pan-European dataset gave us a unique opportunity to compare results of the very same 
model in countries at widely different levels of economic development. And we have shown 
that  this  approach  can  yield  important  insights  into  the  differences  how  activities  of 
multinational firms affect advanced and less advanced countries. As new micro datasets with 
data harmonized across many countries become increasingly available for research purposes 
from  Eurostat  and  elsewhere,  it  becomes  a  major  opportunity  for  future  research  to  put 
forward more comparative evidence of this kind. 
 
As already mentioned above, a major limitation of this analysis is that not much could have 
been done about a potential endogeneity of the estimated coefficients due to a lack of valid 
instruments in the dataset. Any interpretation in terms of causality between the explanatory 
and  dependent  variables  should  be  therefore  put  forward  with  caution.  Another  related 
limitation given by the dataset in hand is the cross-sectional nature of the analysis, because 
the datasets could not be connected due to confidentiality of the respondents. It remains an 
important  challenge  for  future  research  to  address  these  caveats  if  better  data  become 
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LARGE  1.00 
           
 
  MEDIUM  -0.32  1.00 
         
 
  DOMGP  0.21  0.07  1.00 
       
 
  FORGP  0.21  0.07  -0.25  1.00 
     
 
  EXP  0.12  0.13  0.04  0.15  1.00 
   
 
  R&D  0.12  0.06  0.15  0.03  0.23  1.00 
 
 
  INFO  0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.04  0.03  0.05  1.00   
  PROT  0.16  0.03  0.13  0.03  0.19  0.24  0.05  1.00 
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